流域排污权交易下地方政府和企业氮减排演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1498

中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (8): 185-195.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1498

流域排污权交易下地方政府和企业氮减排演化博弈分析

张骥骧^1,2, 席轩¹

1.南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院，江苏南京211106；2.中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所，北京102488

收稿日期:2019-09-29 修回日期:2020-03-18 出版日期:2022-08-18 发布日期:2022-08-18
通讯作者: 张骥骧(1978-)，男(汉族)，安徽淮南人，南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院，副教授，中国社会科学院数量经济与技术经济研究所博士后，研究方向：有限理性博弈与企业经营过程分析与决策，Email：zhang_jixiang@126.com. E-mail:zhang_jixiang@126.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101071)；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(NS2019045)

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Local Governments and Enterprises under Nitrogen Reduction Policies Participating in Emission Trading in River Basin

ZHANG Ji-xiang^1,2, XI Xuan¹

1. College of Economics and Management Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China;2. Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488, China

Received:2019-09-29 Revised:2020-03-18 Online:2022-08-18 Published:2022-08-18
Contact: 张骥骧 E-mail:zhang_jixiang@126.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对目前流域氮污染问题的加剧，本文以在流域排污权交易机制下的有限理性地方政府和企业为博弈主体，运用演化博弈方法研究了在静态和动态补贴政策下地方政府的监管策略和企业的氮减排策略选择的动态演化过程，并分析了各参数对动态补贴政策下均衡点的影响，最后进行了仿真分析。研究结果表明，在静态补贴机制下，系统存在四种演化稳定策略和一种状态下的周期性波动；其中企业的减排策略选择主要根据氮减排成本与收益的比较，政府是否监管主要取决于社会舆论成本与监督成本、补贴费用等因素的比较。当地方政府实施动态补贴机制，博弈双方的演化轨迹线将收敛于唯一的混合策略均衡点。

关键词: 流域排污权交易, 氮减排, 补贴机制, 演化博弈, 演化稳定策略

Abstract: In view of the aggravation of the current problem of nitrogen pollution in the river basin, the dynamic evolution process of the local government’s supervision strategy and the enterprise’s nitrogen emission reduction strategy selection under static and dynamic subsidy policies wasinvestigated based onthe evolutionary game method. The local government and enterprises with bounded rationality participating in the pollution emission trading mechanism are regarded as game players. In present study, the influence of various parameters on the equilibrium point is analyzed under the dynamic subsidy policies, and finally simulation analysis is carried out. The results show that under the static subsidy mechanism, the system has four stable evolutionary strategies and cyclical fluctuations in one situation. Enterprises' choice of emission reduction strategy is mainly based on the comparison between the cost and benefit of nitrogen emission reduction, and whether the government regulates or not is mainly determined by the comparison between the cost of public opinion and the cost of supervision, subsidy and other factors. When the local government implements the dynamic subsidy mechanism, the evolutionary trajectory of both sides of the game will converge to the only mixed strategy equilibrium point.

Key words: emission trading in the river basin, nitrogen emission reduction, subsidy mechanism, evolutionary game, evolutionary stable strategy

中图分类号:

F205

张骥骧, 席轩. 流域排污权交易下地方政府和企业氮减排演化博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(8): 185-195.

ZHANG Ji-xiang, XI Xuan. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Local Governments and Enterprises under Nitrogen Reduction Policies Participating in Emission Trading in River Basin[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(8): 185-195.

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流域排污权交易下地方政府和企业氮减排演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Local Governments and Enterprises under Nitrogen Reduction Policies Participating in Emission Trading in River Basin

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