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中国管理科学 ›› 2002, Vol. ›› Issue (5): 82-86.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

信息失称下的创业资本运营分析

余晓东   

  1. 复旦大学世界经济系, 上海, 200433
  • 收稿日期:2001-08-23 修回日期:2002-08-20 出版日期:2002-10-28 发布日期:2012-03-06

The Operation of Venture Capital under Information Asymmetry

YU Xiao-dong   

  1. Dept of World Economics and Trade, Shanghai 200433, China
  • Received:2001-08-23 Revised:2002-08-20 Online:2002-10-28 Published:2012-03-06

摘要: 信息不对称是创业资本存在和发展于新兴高科技企业融资市场的关键原因。本文把信息不对称和它导致的道德风险问题、逆向选择问题统一于一个模型之中,并且系统分析了创业资本在应对这些问题中所体现的核心能力和竞争优势。文章还简单讨论了信息不对称对创业资本退出方式的影响。

关键词: 信息不对称, 创业资本, 创业企业, 核心能力, 道德风险, 逆向选择

Abstract: Information asymmetry is the key reason for the existence and development of venture capital of high-tech enterprises The paper unifies moral hazard and adverse selection,which arise from information asymmetry, in one model,and analyses systematically the core capability and competition advantage of venture capital as it copes with these problems In addition,this paper discusses the influence of information asymmetry on the exiting approach of venture capital.

Key words: information asymmetry, venture capital, venture enterprise, core capacity, moral hazard, adrerse selection

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