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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (2): 62-67.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑政府引导的电子类产品逆向供应链奖惩机制设计

王文宾1, 达庆利2   

  1. 1. 中国矿业大学管理学院, 江苏徐州221116;
    2. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京211189
  • 收稿日期:2009-04-29 修回日期:2010-03-18 出版日期:2010-04-30 发布日期:2010-04-30
  • 作者简介:王文宾(1979- ),男(汉族),山东诸城人,中国矿业大学管理学院,讲师,博士后,研究方向:闭环供应链管理.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772059)

Study on Premium and Penalty Mechanisms for the Electronic Product Reverse Supply Chain Considering the Leading of Government

WANG Wen-bin1, DA Qing-li2   

  1. 1. School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
  • Received:2009-04-29 Revised:2010-03-18 Online:2010-04-30 Published:2010-04-30

PDF (PC)

1494

被引次数

201

摘要： 本文研究了电子类产品逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制问题,讨论了奖惩机制的最优参数。建立4种情形的决策模型并比较了它们的决策结果。研究表明:奖惩机制下逆向供应链的回收率提高;奖惩机制下回收商的利润大于无奖惩机制情形的利润,回收商的积极性提高;适中的目标回收率水平和较大的奖惩力度搭配能够增加制造商的利润,提高制造商的积极性;奖惩机制下废旧产品的回购价提高,新产品的销售价降低。

关键词: 逆向供应链, 奖惩机制, 回收, 再制造

Abstract: This paper studies the decision-making problem about the electronic product reverse supply chain's premium and penalty mechanism. The optimal parameters of the mechanism are discussed Four decision-making models are established,and the results of these models are compared Several conclusions are derived The collection rate of reverse supply chain increases with the premium and penalty mechanism. The profit of the collector with the premium and penalty mechanism is higher than the profit of the collector without the mechanism,and thus,the collector's enthusiasm increases. Moderate target collection rate level and a high premium and penalty degree can increase the manufacturer's profit,and thus,the manufacturer's enthusiasm increases The waste product's buy-back price increases while the new product's price decreases with the premium and penalty mechanism.

Key words: reverse supply chain, premium and penalty mechanism, collection, remanufacturing

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