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中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (10): 142-154.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0550

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

碳限额与碳交易机制下考虑公平关切的供应链定价与协调研究

邹清明, 胡李庆, 邹霆钧   

  1. 南华大学经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳421001
  • 收稿日期:2020-03-30 修回日期:2020-09-07 出版日期:2022-10-20 发布日期:2022-10-12
  • 通讯作者: 邹清明(1967-),男(汉族),湖南祁东人,南华大学经济管理与法学学院,教授,博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理、决策优化与风险管理,Email:757338274@qq.com. E-mail:757338274@qq.com

Pricing and Coordination of a Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

ZOU Qing-ming, HU Li-qing, ZOU Ting-jun   

  1. School of Economic Management and Law, University of South China, Hengyang 421001, China
  • Received:2020-03-30 Revised:2020-09-07 Online:2022-10-20 Published:2022-10-12
  • Contact: 邹清明 E-mail:757338274@qq.com

摘要: 供应链企业的公平关切是发展与维持良好供应链上下游合作关系的重要因素。面对消费者的低碳偏好与碳排放规制约束,供应链企业在确定最优定价与减排水平等运作决策时,常常表现较强的公平关切倾向。探究环保规制下公平关切如何影响供应链的运作决策,可以为供应链合作提供对策。本文在碳限额与碳交易机制下,研究了由公平关切制造商和公平关切零售商组成的低碳供应链的最优定价和碳减排率等决策,分析了公平关切对最优定价和碳减排水平及利润的影响,并讨论了收益共享-成本共担契约模型对供应链的协调性,最后通过数值仿真验证了主要结论。结果表明:(1)制造商和零售商都公平关切时,收益共享-成本共担契约的参数若满足一定条件,供应链可以实现协调。(2)批发价与制造商公平关切系数正相关,零售价与制造商和零售商公平关切系数都正相关;若制造商考虑零售商公平关切则批发价的变化取决于碳减排成本系数的大小,碳减排率与制造商和零售商的公平关切系数是负相关;若制造商忽视零售商的公平关切,则批发价仅受制造商自身公平关切的影响, 碳减排率与制造商公平关切负相关,与零售商公平关切无关。(3)制造商公平关切对双方利润具有负向影响,零售商公平关切对制造商利润也有负向影响,而零售商利润随自身公平关切的变化情况取决于制造商是否考虑其公平关切,若考虑则两者正相关,否则两者负相关。

关键词: 碳限额与碳交易;公平关切;定价;协调

Abstract: The fairness concerns of supply chain firms has been regarded as a vital role in developing and sustaining benign cooperation relationships between upstream and downstream in the supply chain. Confronted with consumers’ low-carbon preferences and the constraints of carbon emission regulations, supply chain firms often show a strong fairness concerns when determining operational decisions such as optimal pricing and emission reduction levels. Exploring how fairness concerns affect supply chain operational decisions under environmental protection regulations can provide countermeasures for supply chain cooperation. In a two-echelon supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, the optimal operational decisions are studied such as pricing and carbon-emission reduction when the manufacturer and retailer are fairness concern, and the impact of fairness concern on the optimal pricing and carbon emission reduction and the expected profit is analyzed. The coordination performance of the revenue- sharing and cost-sharing contract also investigated for the supply chain. Finally, several numerical experiments are given to verify the main theoretical results. The results show that: (1) when both manufacturers and retailers are fairness concerns, the supply chain can achieve coordination if the parameters of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract satisfy some conditions. (2) The wholesale price is positively correlated with the manufacturer’s fairness concerns, and the retail price is positively correlated with the manufacturer’s and retailer’s fairness concern. If the manufacturer considers the retailer’s fairness concern, the change of the wholesale price depends on the carbon-emission reduction cost coefficient, and the carbon emission reduction rate is negatively correlated with the manufacturer’s and retailer’s fairness concern. If the manufacturer ignores the retailer’s fairness concern, the wholesale price is only affected by the manufacturer’s own fairness concern, and the carbon- emission reduction rate is negatively correlated with the manufacturer’s fairness concern and has nothing to do with the retailer’s fairness concern. (3) The profits of both sides will be negatively correlated with manufacturer’s fairness concern, and the retailer’s concerns about fairness will also have a negative impact on the manufacturer’s profits. The change of the retailer’s profits with his own fairness concern depends on whether the manufacturer considers retailer’s fairness concern, if manufacturer considered retailer’s fairness concern, both are positive correlation, otherwise both are negative correlation.

Key words: carbon cap-and-trade; fairness concern; pricing; coordination

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