基于图模型理论的模糊权力不对称冲突研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2205

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为了进一步解决决策者间权力不对称程度具有不确定性的现实冲突，基于冲突分析图模型理论提出两个决策者的模糊权力不对称冲突分析方法。首先，划分冲突中决策者之间的权力结构；其次，构建模糊权力不对称下的冲突分析图模型，包括领导者、跟随者的模糊改良偏好，跟随者的模糊权力改良偏好等；进一步，定义领导者、跟随者在模糊权力不对称下稳定性的逻辑表达和矩阵表达等；最后，利用冲突分析图模型理论框架下的模糊权力不对称稳定性，求解“双碳目标”下供应链碳减排冲突的均衡解。案例研究结果表明，本文所提出的方法能有效化解不同权力结构下的冲突。

关键词: 冲突分析图模型, 模糊理论, 模糊权力不对称, 稳定性分析

Abstract:

As China’s economy enters the stage of high-quality development， the conflicts between different groups become more complex and intense. For example， under the “3060 carbon peak and neutrality” goal， local governments have taken measures such as “power rationing”， which has caused multiple disputes in the society. Finding a balance between economic growth and reducing energy consumption has become a hot topic. The power asymmetry among decision makers （DMs） is a common problem， and the uncertainty of the power asymmetry makes it more difficult to resolve the conflict. It is of great significance to effectively resolve the power asymmetric conflicts of different degrees between DMs. To further resolve the realistic conflicts with uncertain power asymmetry between DMs， a fuzzy asymmetric power conflict analysis is proposed based on a graph model with two decision makers， a leader and a follower. Firstly， the power structure between DMs is divided into three types in conflicts. Secondly， the graph model for conflict resolution （GMCR） under fuzzy power asymmetry is constructed， which includes fuzzy improved preference of the leader and the follower， and unilateral improvement under fuzzy power for the follower. When power among DMs changes， the preferences of leader and follower also change. Further， the logical and matrix of asymmetry stabilities of the follower and leader under fuzzy power are defined. Finally， the equilibria of supply chain carbon emission reduction conflict of “carbon peak” and “carbon neutral” goals are solved using the proposed stabilities of fuzzy power asymmetry under the framework of graph model for conflict resolution. After analyzing the actual background of supply chain carbon emission reduction conflict under “3060 carbon peak and neutrality” goal， the results of the case study show that the proposed method can effectively resolve the conflict under different power structures. At the same time， the following management enlightenments are also provided： 1） Upstream manufacturer need to attract downstream manufacturer to participate in the research and development of new carbon emission reduction technologies together. 2） In order to promote the realization of carbon emission reduction targets， local governments need to introduce strict carbon emission reduction policies to guide enterprises to produce low-carbon products. And they can dynamically adjust product procurement policies according to the changes of market environment to achieve the ideal balance of conflict resolution. Different with the previous studies， not only the power asymmetry conflict is considered in this paper， but also the fuzzy power structure is taken into account， which further enriches the theoretical research of GMCR.

Key words: graph model for conflict resolution, fuzzy theory, fuzzy power asymmetry, stability analysis

中图分类号:

C934

陈璐,徐海燕,张瑾木子,何亮. 基于图模型理论的模糊权力不对称冲突研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(9): 59-69.

Lu Chen,Haiyan Xu,Jinmuzi Zhang,Liang He. Study on Fuzzy Power Asymmetric Conflict Analysis Based on the Graph Model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(9): 59-69.

图/表 11

图1

表1

不同权力结构决策者改良偏好集及单边改良集对比"

权力结构	权力完全对称（ $d = 0$ ）	模糊权力不对称（ $0 ≤ d ≤ 1$ ）	权力完全不对称（ $d = 1$ ）
改良偏好集	$Φ j + (s)$	$Φ ? j f d + (s) = (Φ j +, = (s) ? Φ i * f' + (s)) ? Φ j f + (s)$	$Φ ? j p + (s) = Φ j +, = (s) ? Φ i * + (s)$
强单边改良集	$R j + (s)$	$R ? j f d + (s) = R j (s) ? Φ ? j f d + (s)$	$R ? j p + (s) = R j (s) ? Φ ? j p + (s)$
弱单边改良集	/	$R ? j f w + (s) = R j (s) ? ((Φ j + (s) ? Φ i * f'' =, - (s)) ? Φ j f + (s))$	$R ? j w + (s) = R j (s) ? (Φ j + (s) ? Φ i * =, - (s))$

表1

表2

“双碳目标”下供应链碳减排冲突事件可行状态"

决策者	策略	状态点
决策者	策略	$s 1$	$s 2$	$s 3$	$s 4$	$s 5$	$s 6$	$s 7$	$s 8$	$s 9$
上游制造商DM1^*	碳减排（ $O 1$ ）	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
上游制造商DM1^*	转移成本（ $O 2$ ）	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	-
下游制造商DM2	协同减排（ $O 3$ ）	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	-
下游制造商DM2	分摊成本（ $O 4$ ）	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	-

表2

图2

表3

“双碳目标”下供应链碳减排冲突一般稳定性结果（d=0）"

状态点	Nash			GMR			SMR			SEQ
状态点	DM1^*	DM2	E	DM1^*	DM2	E	DM1^*	DM2	E	DM1^*	DM2	E
$s 1$	√			√			√			√
$s 2$		√			√			√			√
$s 3$	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 4$		√		√	√	*	√	√	*		√
$s 5$				√			√			√
$s 6$	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 7$		√		√	√	*	√	√	*		√
$s 8$	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 9$	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*	√	√	*

表3

表4

“双碳目标”下供应链碳减排冲突权力不对称稳定性结果（d=1）"

状态点	LNash	FNash	E	FGMR	FSMR	LSEQ	FSEQ	E	LSSEQ	FSSEQ	E
$s 1$	√			√	√	√			√
$s 2$				√	√
$s 3$	√	√	*	√	√	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 4$				√	√
$s 5$				√	√	√			√
$s 6$	√			√	√	√			√
$s 7$		√		√	√		√			√
$s 8$	√			√	√	√			√
$s 9$	√	√	*	√	√	√	√	*	√	√	*

表4

表5

“双碳目标”下供应链碳减排冲突模糊权力不对称稳定性结果（d=0.3）"

状态点	FLNash	FFNash	E	FFGMR	FFSMR	FLSEQ	FFSEQ	E	FLSSEQ	FFSSEQ	E
$s 1$	√			√	√	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 2$				√	√
$s 3$	√	√	*	√	√	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 4$				√	√
$s 5$				√	√	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 6$	√			√	√	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 7$		√		√	√		√			√
$s 8$	√			√	√	√	√	*	√	√	*
$s 9$	√	√	*	√	√	√	√	*	√	√	*

表5

图3

图4

图5

图6

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