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中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 143-152.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0947

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

促销模式下基于纳什谈判的线上旅行商与线下旅行社定价策略研究

谭春桥1,2, 吴欣2, 崔春生1   

  1. 1. 北京物资学院信息学院, 北京 101149;
    2. 中南大学商学院, 湖南 长沙 410083
  • 收稿日期:2018-07-04 修回日期:2019-06-06 发布日期:2021-04-02
  • 通讯作者: 谭春桥(1975-),男(汉族),湖南祁阳人,中南大学商学院,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:博弈论及应用、运作管理,E-mail:chunqiaot@sina.com. E-mail:chunqiaot@sina.com
  • 作者简介:谭春桥(1975-),男(汉族),湖南祁阳人,中南大学商学院,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:博弈论及应用、运作管理,E-mail:chunqiaot@sina.com.
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971218,71671188);北京市智能物流系统协同创新中心及开放课题资助项目(BILSCIC-2018KF-04)

Pricing Strategies of Tour Operator and Online Travel Agency Based on Nash Bargaining in Promotion Model

TAN Chun-qiao1,2, WU Xin2, CUI Chun-sheng1   

  1. 1. School of Information, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, China;
    2. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
  • Received:2018-07-04 Revised:2019-06-06 Published:2021-04-02

摘要: 本文针对O2O模式下线下旅行社(TO)与线上旅行商(OTA)在采取促销手段时的定价策略进行研究。首先根据促销成本的承担对象划分出由TO单独承担促销成本和TO与OTA共同承担促销成本这两种促销模式,然后通过纳什谈判确定销售佣金的定价策略,研究TO与OTA的谈判能力不同且双方承担的促销成本比例变化的情况下旅游产品和促销努力水平的定价策略。结果表明:当TO的谈判能力越大时,TO所需付出的销售佣金越小,促销的努力水平越高,销售价格越低,且TO的利润越大;而且,OTA的利润随着TO谈判能力的提高而下降。此外,通过对两种促销模式下TO的利润、OTA的利润以及整体利润的对比分析得出,应依据TO与OTA共同承担促销的这种促销模式下TO承担促销的比例来确定采用的促销模式。

关键词: O2O模式, 纳什谈判, 促销, 定价策略

Abstract: With the popularity of the Internet, the trend of online shopping is unstoppable, and the tourism industry has begun to try to provide customers with online ordering services to increase sales. Tour operator(TO) needs to spend a lot of manpower and material resources to open a new online travel website, while online travel agency(OTA) can hardly guarantee service differentiation under existing costs, which shows that TO and OTA are difficult to achieve results in the O2O model based solely on their own resources. Therefore, TO and OTA need to cooperate to create the O2O model. And OTA and TO can use the superior resources of both sides to complement each other. It is worth mentioning that the tourism promotion is very common and diverse. However, the existing literature lacks quantitative research on the level of tourism promotion efforts, and the existing research does not consider the linear change of TO's bargaining power. Therefore, in this paper, pricing strategies of tour operator(TO) and online travel agency(OTA) in promotion model are studied, and OTA provides online bookings for consumers, for which TO needs to pay OTA commission and provide travel services to customers who have already made online reservations. And The Nash bargaining model is constructed, in which, the TO's bargaining power is linear. In order to facilitate research, the model contains only one TO and one OTA. Firstly, the optimal pricing strategies are derived when TO bears the promotion cost, and then further the cost sharing contract is considered and the impacts on commission and promotion efforts are studied. The results show that the unit sale commission and OTA's profit decrease with TO's bargaining power, but TO's bargaining power has a positive impact on the promotion efforts, sale price, and the TO's profit. What's more, from the perspective of the profit of TO and OTA, whether the basic model or the impacts of cost sharing model is better depends on the value of the proportion of promotion cost, which is consistent with the actual situation. The promotion under the O2O model in the tourism industry is discussed, which has guiding significance for the cooperation strategies between TO and OTA.

Key words: O2O model, Nash bargaining, promotion, pricing strategies

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