EPR制度意义下制造商和零售商激励契约研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 122-130.

EPR制度意义下制造商和零售商激励契约研究

白少布^1,2, 刘洪²

1. 南京工程学院, 江苏南京 211100;
2. 南京大学商学院, 江苏南京 210093

收稿日期:2010-07-19 修回日期:2012-03-06 出版日期:2012-06-29 发布日期:2012-07-05
基金资助:
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2010SJB630029);江苏博士后科研资助基金项目(0802055C)

Incentive Contract between Manufacturer and Dealers with EPR

BAI Shao-bu^1,2, LIU Hong²

1. Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167, China;
2. School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China

Received:2010-07-19 Revised:2012-03-06 Online:2012-06-29 Published:2012-07-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在EPR制度约束下,制造商和零售商之间形成产品供销和回收委托代理关系。本文通过引入废旧产品回收对产品销量的影响因子概念,建立了EPR制度约束下的制造商和零售商委托代理激励契约模型。通过该模型的分析,制造商可以设计最优激励契约,使自身的期望利润效用最大化;零售商通过一定的销售努力和回收努力投入(最优努力投入),可获得制造商提供的最优激励支付,从而实现期望利润效用的最大化。

关键词: EPR制度, 委托代理, 激励契约, 影响因子

Abstract: According to the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) rules, a principal-agent relationship involving product supply, marketing, and recycling between a producer and his dealers is formed. By introducing the impact factor which indicates the impact on product sales by used product recycling, a principal-agent incentive contract model with the EPR system is proposed. Based on the model, the manufacturer works out an optimal incentive contract to maximize his expected benefit utility. To reap the optimal incentive benefit provided by the manufacturer, the dealers optimize their levels of selling effort and recycling effort, thus maximize their expected benefit utility.

Key words: EPR system, principal-agent, incentive contract, impact factor

中图分类号:

F270.3

白少布, 刘洪. EPR制度意义下制造商和零售商激励契约研究 [J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, (3): 122-130.

BAI Shao-bu, LIU Hong. Incentive Contract between Manufacturer and Dealers with EPR[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (3): 122-130.

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