道德约束环境下的Nash实施

中国管理科学 ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (3): 158-164.

道德约束环境下的Nash实施

刘昌臣, 肖江文, 罗云峰

华中科技大学系统工程研究所, 湖北武汉430074

收稿日期:2009-10-30 修回日期:2010-05-17 出版日期:2010-06-30 发布日期:2010-06-30
作者简介:刘晶臣(1980- ),男(汉族),湖北武汉人,华中科技大学控制科学与工程系博士,研究方向:决策分析、博弈论、实施理论.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60674083)

Nash Implementation with Cost of Signal

LIU Chang-chen, XIAO Jiang-wen, LUO Yun-feng

Institute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China

Received:2009-10-30 Revised:2010-05-17 Online:2010-06-30 Published:2010-06-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 探讨了代理人发送信号的成本对社会选择规则可实施性的影响,证明了在存在道德约束的实施环境中,单调性不再是一个社会选择规则可Nash实施的必要条件。当代理人数量大于2时,满足一致性条件的社会选择规则都是可Nash实施的。当代理人数量等于2,满足交叉性条件和一致性条件的社会选择规则是可Nash实施的。结论表明:在实际的实施问题中,社会选择规则可实施的范围可能远远大于预期,在存在道德约束的实施环境中,一些不满足单调性但却满足一致性条件的社会选择规则,如Pareto规则都是可Nash实施的。

关键词: 社会选择规则, Nash实施, 信号成本

Abstract: The paper discusses the impact of cost of signal on the implementability of social choice rule. The result of the paper shows that,in environment with moral constraint,monotonicity is nolonger a necessary condition for Nash implementation.In environment with moral constraint,when the number of agents is no less than 3,any social choice rule that satisfies unanimity is Nashim plementable,and when the number of agents is 2,any social choice rule that satisfies unanimity and intersection is Nashimplem entable.According to the results of this paper,the number of social choice rules which are implementable may be larger than we have thought.In environment with moral constraint,some social choice rules which do not satisfy monot onicity but unanimity,such as Pareto rule and Borda rule,are also Nash implementable.

Key words: social choice rule, Nash implementation, cost of signal

中图分类号:

刘昌臣, 肖江文, 罗云峰. 道德约束环境下的Nash实施[J]. 中国管理科学, 2010, 18(3): 158-164.

LIU Chang-chen, XIAO Jiang-wen, LUO Yun-feng. Nash Implementation with Cost of Signal[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2010, 18(3): 158-164.