主管：中国科学院
主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
　　　中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院
中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (3): 148-157.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于博弈模型的“公司+农户”模式契约稳定性及模式优化

涂国平1,2,3, 冷碧滨2,3   

  1. 1. 南昌大学中国中部经济发展研究中心, 江西南昌330047;
    2. 南昌大学系统工程研究所, 江西南昌330031;
    3. 南昌大学管理科学与工程系, 江西南昌330031
  • 收稿日期:2009-10-09 修回日期:2010-04-19 出版日期:2010-06-30 发布日期:2010-06-30
  • 作者简介:涂国平(1963- ),男(汉族),江西南昌人,南昌大学系统工程研究所,南昌大学管理科学与工程系主任,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:系统工程与管理科学.
  • 基金资助:

    江西省科技厅软科学基金项目;江西省教育厅项目

Contract Stability and Optimization of “Company & Farmer” Mode Bosed on Game Model

TU Guo-ping1,2,3, LENG Bi-bin2,3   

  1. 1. Center for Central China Economic Development Research, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330047, China;
    2. Institute of Systems Engineering, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China;
    3. Department of Management Science and Engineer, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China
  • Received:2009-10-09 Revised:2010-04-19 Online:2010-06-30 Published:2010-06-30

PDF (PC)

969

摘要： 为探索解决"公司+农户"模式违约问题的优化模式和对策,通过静态博弈模型揭示了"公司+农户"模式违约问题的根本原因是市场风险的存在,并得出了稳定的"公司+农户"模式的价格波动区间;契约稳定性模型揭示了"利益共享"的分配机制、"公司+农户"经营模式交易费用的降低、约束机制的加强和信誉机制的建立都有利于"公司+农户"经营模式的稳定和发展。引入期货、期货期权对"公司+农户"模式进行优化,通过博弈模型分析得出:"公司+农户+期货"优化模式能解决公司的违约问题,但没能解决农户的机会主义行为和违约问题;"公司+农户+期货期权"优化模式从根本上扼制了农户的违约行为,规避了公司远期合约的市场风险,稳定了公司未来的得益和农产品货源,也解决了公司的风险和违约问题。

关键词: “公司+农户”, 期货期权, 博弈

Abstract: In order to explore optimization mode and counterm easures for solving breaking contract problem of "Company&Farmer",the established static game model reveals that the basic reason of the breaking contract problem of "Company&Farmer" is market risk,and the price fluctuation interval of static "Company&Farmer" is obtained.The established contract stability model reveales that the distribution mechanism of "benefit sharing",the reduction of the transaction cost of "Company&Farmer",the strengthening restraint mechanism and the establishment of reputation mechanism are all helpful for stability and development of "Company&Farmer".Simultaneously,futures and options are introduced to optimize "Company&Farmer",and the "Company&Farmer&futures" optimization mode can solve breaking contract risk of company,but not solve breaking contractrisk of farmer;and the "Company&Farmer&options" optimization mode rest rains breaking contract behavior of farmer radically,which can avoid risk of company,lock the company's future profit,and stabilize the source of goods of agricultural product,and also solves the problem of the risk and contract breaking behavior of company.

Key words: “Company&Farmer”, options, game

中图分类号: