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中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (3): 96-105.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2244

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

零售商信息禀赋优势下制造商电商直销渠道决策

赵骅1, 张晗1, 李志国2   

  1. 1.重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044;2.重庆工商大学管理科学与工程学院,重庆400067
  • 收稿日期:2020-08-26 修回日期:2020-12-15 出版日期:2022-03-19 发布日期:2022-03-19
  • 通讯作者: 张晗(1996-),女(汉族),河南南阳人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,博士研究生,研究方向:企业集群供应链管理,Email: zhanghan25@cqu.edu.cn. E-mail:zhanghan25@cqu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    中国工程院重大咨询项目(2019-ZD-CQ-5);重庆市哲学社会科学规划研究重点项目(2018ZD05)

Manufacturer Encroachment in E-commerce Channel with Retailer’s Advantage of Information Possession

ZHAO Hua1, ZHANG Han1, LI Zhi-guo2   

  1. 1. School of Economies and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
  • Received:2020-08-26 Revised:2020-12-15 Online:2022-03-19 Published:2022-03-19
  • Contact: 张晗 E-mail:zhanghan25@cqu.edu.cn

摘要: 在供应链中由于零售商相比制造商掌握更多消费者信息,能够对市场需求进行预测,因此制造商在建立直销渠道决策时往往面临着市场需求信息的不对称。本文考虑一个由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链,其中零售商向制造商订购产品并销售给终端市场,制造商可能建立直销渠道将产品直接销售给消费者。通过构建制造商无入侵、对称信息下和不对称信息下制造商入侵三种情形下的博弈模型,本文分析了制造商建立直销渠道决策和零售商的订货决策。研究发现,尽管零售商具有信息禀赋优势,制造商建立直销渠道总是能够获得更多的利润,并且在信息不对称情况下制造商建立直销渠道获得的利润大于在信息对称情况下获得的利润。而零售商与之相反,在制造商掌握市场预测信息的情况下零售商的收益更高,供应链总收益在对称信息的情况下最高。进一步考虑制造商按照自身信息禀赋进行备货量决策的情况,可以得到按照自身信息禀赋与零售商同时决策时制造商建立直销渠道的利润大于信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下的利润。

关键词: 非对称信息;制造商入侵;信号博弈;订货决策

Abstract: In recent years, the rapid development of online retailing has attracted many manufacturers to establish e-commerce direct sales channel on the basis of traditional retail channel. However, in the supply chain the retailer has more consumer information than the manufacturer to predict market demand, the manufacturer often faces asymmetric demand information relative to the retailer when building direct sales channel. A supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer is considered, where the retailer orders products from the manufacturer and sells to the end market, and the manufacturer has the incentive to establish direct sales channel to consumers. Three scenarios are modelled to investigate the manufacturer’s encroachment decision and the retailer's order decision, including no manufacturer encroachment scenario, manufacturer encroachment under symmetric information scenario and manufacturer encroachment under asymmetric information scenario. The results are further verified through numerical simulation.

Key words: asymmetric information; manufacturer encroachment; Signaling game; order decision

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