产业共性技术产学研协同研发策略的微分博弈研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.12.019

中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (12): 197-207.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.12.019

产业共性技术产学研协同研发策略的微分博弈研究

马永红^1,2, 刘海礁^1,3, 柳清^3,4

1. 哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院, 黑龙江哈尔滨 150001;
2. 哈尔滨工程大学企业创新研究所, 黑龙江哈尔滨 150001;
3. 美国北卡罗莱纳大学教堂山分校中国城市研究中心, 北卡罗莱纳州教堂山 27599;
4. 哈尔滨工业大学建筑学院, 黑龙江哈尔滨 150001

收稿日期:2017-11-26 修回日期:2018-05-16 出版日期:2019-12-20 发布日期:2019-12-30
通讯作者: 刘海礁(1988-),男(汉族),黑龙江绥滨人,哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,博士生,北卡罗莱纳大学中国城市研究中心联合培养博士生,研究方向:科技创新与管理创新,E-mail:415715866@qq.com. E-mail:415715866@qq.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71373060）；国家社会科学基金重点资助项目（14AGL004）；黑龙江省自然科学基金资助项目（G201404）；黑龙江省社科基金资助项目（13D011）

Differential Game Study on Industry-University Synergetic R&D Strategy of Industrial Generic Technology

MA Yong-hong^1,2, LIU Hai-jiao^1,3, LIU Qing^3,4

1. School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China;
2. Enterprise Innovation Research Institute, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China;
3. Program on Chinese Cities, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill 27599, the United States;
4. School of Architecture, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China

Received:2017-11-26 Revised:2018-05-16 Online:2019-12-20 Published:2019-12-30

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对产业共性技术产学研协同研发问题，本文以单个研究机构（大学、科研院所）和单个企业为研究对象，通过构建微分博弈模型，运用HJB方程分别分析了三种产业共性技术研发博弈情形下研究机构和企业各自的最优研发努力程度、最优研发收益、双方最优研发总收益以及企业对研究机构的研发投入补贴。通过对三种博弈结果的比较分析发现：（1）研发投入补贴作为一种激励策略，可促进研究机构研发努力程度、研究机构与企业各自研发收益以及双方研发总收益的提升；（2）协同合作博弈情形下研究机构与企业各自研发努力程度、各自研发收益和双方研发总收益均优于非合作情形。为协调研究机构与企业的产业共性技术协同研发行为，通过讨论收益分配系数α的取值范围进而分析产业共性技术产学研协同研发的收益协调机制。最后，通过算例分析验证了理论推导的结果。

关键词: 产业共性技术, 产学研, 协同研发, 微分博弈, HJB方程

Abstract: This article examines the industrial generic technology collaborative research and development of a single research institution (university, research institute) and a single enterprise that are completely rational and have complete information for the conflict between the cooperation motives and behavioral goals caused by the heterogeneity of innovation resources in universities, research institutes, and enterprises during the collaborative R&D of industrial generic technology. Research institution is mainly responsible for basic research of industrial generic technology and company is mainly responsible for the application and development of industrial generic technology. In order to motivate the enthusiasm of research institutions for research and development, enterprises provide research institutions with a certain percentage of R&D investment subsidies. The Hamilton-Jacoby-Berman equation (HJB equation) is used to investigate the respective behaviors of universities, research institutes and enterprises in three cases:Nash non-cooperative R & D game, Stackelberg master-slave R & D game and cooperative R&D game through constructing the differential game model of industry-general-technology and industry-university-research cooperation research and development. The degree of optimal R&D effort, the optimal R&D income and the total optimal R&D income of both sides are analyzed, the effect mechanism of R&D subsidy on industry-university-research collaborative research and development of industrial generic technology is discussed, and the coordination mechanism among the subjects of industry-general-technology industry-university-research collaborative innovation under the dynamic framework is seeked. Through the comparison of the three game results, the following conclusions are drawn:R&D investment subsidy, as an incentive strategy, can promote the research and development efforts of research institutions, the research and development income of both sides and the total R&D income of both sides. Besides, In the case of cooperative game, the degree of respective R&D effort, respective R&D income and total R&D income of both parties are better than that of non-cooperative case, and there is a threshold value of income distribution coefficientα, which can realize the Pareto improvement of individual income of both sides. Specific content as follows:1) In the case of Nash non-cooperative game and Stackelberg master-slave game, the degree of R&D effort of enterprises does not change. In the case of Stackelberg master-slave game, the degree of R&D effort of research institutions is significantly higher than that of Nash non-cooperative game. The raised level is equal to the coefficient of R&D investment subsidy, which indicates that R&D investment subsidy, as an incentive mechanism, can improve the R&D effort of research institutions. In the case of cooperative game, the degree of R&D effort of enterprises and research institutions is better than that of non-cooperative game. 2) In the case of Stackelberg master-slave game, the R&D income of enterprises and research institutions are better than that of Nash non-cooperative game, that is, when enterprises provide R&D investment subsidies to research institutions, the R&D returns of enterprises and research institutions are improved.3) In the case of cooperative cooperation game, the total R&D revenue of enterprises and research institutions is superior to that of Stackelberg's master-slave game. Under the Stackelberg master-slave game, the total R&D revenue of enterprises and research institutions is better than that of Nash non-cooperative games. In order to coordinate the cooperative R&D behavior of industry generic technology between research institutions and enterprises, the range of income distribution coefficient α is discussed and analyzes the revenue coordination mechanism of industry-university-research collaboration R&D of industrial general technology is analyzed. Finally, the results of theoretical derivation are verified by randomly setting parameters within the assumed condition of the article.

Key words: industrial generic technology, industry-university-research, synergetic R&D, differential game, HJB equation

中图分类号:

C934

马永红, 刘海礁, 柳清. 产业共性技术产学研协同研发策略的微分博弈研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(12): 197-207.

MA Yong-hong, LIU Hai-jiao, LIU Qing. Differential Game Study on Industry-University Synergetic R&D Strategy of Industrial Generic Technology[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(12): 197-207.

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产业共性技术产学研协同研发策略的微分博弈研究

Differential Game Study on Industry-University Synergetic R&D Strategy of Industrial Generic Technology

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