跨国绿色创新国际合作中机会主义行为治理机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0862

中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (4): 213-224.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0862

跨国绿色创新国际合作中机会主义行为治理机制研究

杨文珂¹, 张广欣², 何建敏¹

1. 东南大学经济管理学院, 江苏南京 211189;
2. 昆明理工大学管理与经济学院, 云南昆明 650093

收稿日期:2019-06-14 修回日期:2019-08-29 出版日期:2021-04-20 发布日期:2021-04-25
通讯作者: 杨文珂(1994-),男(汉族),四川成都人,东南大学经济管理学院,博士研究生,研究方向:绿色创新与金融复杂性、金融创新与风险管理,E-mail:wenkeyang@seu.edu.cn. E-mail:wenkeyang@seu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助面上项目（71971055）；国家自然科学基金资助项目（71774036）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目；江苏省研究生科研创新计划项目（KYCX20_0165）

Research on Governance Mechanism of Opportunistic Behavior in International Cooperation on Green Innovation

YANG Wen-ke¹, ZHANG Guang-xin², HE Jian-min¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China;
2. Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming 650093, China

Received:2019-06-14 Revised:2019-08-29 Online:2021-04-20 Published:2021-04-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 跨国绿色创新国际合作是提高本土企业绿色创新能力，拓展外商企业发展空间的有效途径，但国际合作过程中机会主义行为造成跨国绿色创新国际合作的短期化。本文基于演化博弈理论及模拟仿真手段探索跨国绿色创新国际合作机会主义行为治理机制，以及外商直接投资、对外直接投资及政府监管对跨国绿色创新国际合作机会主义行为治理的作用关系。研究表明：外商直接投资增加、与市场状况和产业类别相匹配的政府监管强度均可有效遏制跨国绿色创新国际合作中机会主义行为，使其向互惠主义策略演化，但对外直接投资因逆向技术溢出效应较弱，对其遏制作用效果甚微。同时，乐观的绿色创新国际合作市场前景将显著抑制国际合作中的机会主义行为，有利于长期绿色创新合作关系的维持，而悲观的市场前景不利于跨国绿色创新国际合作稳定性。最后，本文设计出最优机会主义行为治理机制，促进跨国绿色创新国际合作双赢目标的实现。

关键词: 跨国绿色创新, 国际合作, 机会主义, 演化博弈

Abstract: International cooperation on green innovation is an effective way to improve the green innovation capability of local enterprises and expand the development space of foreign enterprises. Nevertheless, opportunistic behavior in the process of international cooperation has shortened the international cooperation period of green innovation. Based on evolutionary game theory and simulation methods, this paper focuses on the governance mechanism of opportunistic behavior in international cooperation on green innovation, and the relationship between foreign direct investment, outward direct investment and government supervision on the governance of opportunistic behavior in international cooperation on green innovation. It is shown shows that the increase of foreign direct investment and the government supervision that matches the market conditions and industry categories can effectively restrain the opportunistic behavior in the international cooperation on green innovation, and make a transform to reciprocal strategy. However, foreign direct investment has little inhibitory effect on it due to the weak reverse technology spillover effect. In the meanwhile, optimistic market prospects for the international cooperation on green innovation will significantly restrain the opportunistic behavior in international cooperation and help to maintain long-term cooperation on green innovation, but the pessimistic prospects will be detrimental to the stability of international cooperation on green innovation. In conclusion, the best governance mechanism of opportunistic behavior is designed to help to reach the win-win goal of international cooperation on green innovation.

Key words: transnational green innovation, international cooperation, opportunism, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F224.32

杨文珂, 张广欣, 何建敏. 跨国绿色创新国际合作中机会主义行为治理机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(4): 213-224.

YANG Wen-ke, ZHANG Guang-xin, HE Jian-min. Research on Governance Mechanism of Opportunistic Behavior in International Cooperation on Green Innovation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(4): 213-224.

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跨国绿色创新国际合作中机会主义行为治理机制研究

Research on Governance Mechanism of Opportunistic Behavior in International Cooperation on Green Innovation

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