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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (4): 225-236.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1146

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

第三方国际环境审计下考虑政府监管与公众监督策略选择的演化博弈研究

曲国华1, 杨柳1, 曲卫华2,3, 李巧梅1   

  1. 1. 山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 山西 太原 030006;
    2. 山西大学管理决策研究所, 山西 太原 030006;
    3. 山西大学经济与管理学院, 山西 太原 030006
  • 收稿日期:2019-08-04 修回日期:2019-12-04 发布日期:2021-04-25
  • 通讯作者: 曲卫华(1982-),男(汉族),山西忻州人,山西大学,副教授,博士,博士生导师,研究方向,能源经济与金融、金融工程与风险管理,E-mail:quweihua@sxu.edu.cn. E-mail:quweihua@sxu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71874103）；山西省研究生教育改革课题项目（2019JG131，2020YJJG009）；山西财经大学2020年度"非标准答案考试"课程立项建设项目

Game Model to Analyze Strategy Options between Government Regulation and Public Supervision under in the Third Party International Environmental Audit

QU Guo-hua1, YANG liu1, QU Wei-hua2,3, LI Qiao-mei1   

  1. 1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    2. Institute of Management and Decision, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    3. School of Management and Economics, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China
  • Received:2019-08-04 Revised:2019-12-04 Published:2021-04-25

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摘要： 企业环境行为问题，特别是企业不当的环境行为对环境造成的潜在影响已成为全球迫切需要解决的问题。第三方国际环境审计能够驱动污染企业积极实施绿色环境行为，基于此文章引入第三方国际环境审计，致立于驱动企业环境行为朝着理想的状态演化，基于有限理性假设的条件，构建了政府、污染企业与公众的演化博弈模型，建立三主体的复制动态方程，得到不同情况下政府、企业与公众的演化稳定策略，探索第三方国际环境介入下的三方决策主体的演化路径和规律，进一步揭示第三方国际环境审计的应用价值。最后，通过仿真分析研究影响三主体最终策略选择的因素。研究表明，政府策略选择对企业是否加入第三方国际环境审计、公众是否参与监督企业加入第三方国际环境审计具有引导作用，公众是否监督企业加入第三方国际环境审计影响企业是否加入第三方国际环境审计；政府、企业与公众三主体的最终策略选择不仅与各主体的初始参与比例有关，同时与其余参数的初始值有关。在不同背景下，政府、企业和公众可以通过理性决策和策略选择，使得三方博弈主体的行为选择能够朝着理想方向演化联合有效遏制企业不当的环境行为，为企业绿色环境行为的积极实施提供相应的参考。

关键词: 第三方国际环境审计, 政府监管, 策略选择, 演化博弈, 环境污染

Abstract: The enterprise environmental behavior problem caused by humans has affected the public health and has become an urgent problem to be solved in the world. This issue has become a hot topic to research for scholars at home and abroad.The third-party international environmental auditing can have a potentially significant effect on enterprise green environmental behavior. Based on the above analysis, the third-party international environmental auditing is introduced to become an important concept of promoting the enterprise environmental behavior problem towards ideal state. The paper considers whether the public participates in the supervision of enterprises to join the third-party international environmental auditing and the evolutionary game model of government, enterprises and the public has been built. In different situations, the government, enterprises and the public's evolutionary stabilization strategy; through the case study, the factors affecting the final strategy choice of the three main bodies are analyzed. Based on the hypothesis of limited reason, the evolutionary path and law of the three game subjects are explored and tried to find the approach to improve the enterprise environmental behavior problem is tried to be found, which could be as a reference for further application of government and enterprise procurement decision. The research shows that the government, enterprises and the public influence each other. The choice of government strategies can guide enterprises to join the third-party international environmental auditing, and whether the public participate in the supervision of enterprises to join the third-party international environmental auditing. Whether the public supervises enterprises to join the third-party international environmental auditing influences enterprises to join the third-party International environmental auditing or not. To join the third-party international environmental audit, the final strategy choice of the government, enterprises and the public is not only related to the initial participation proportion of each subject, but also related to the initial participation proportion of the other subjects.It would be very wise for government, enterprise and public to weigh gain and losses of taking responsibility in inappropriate enterprise environmental behavior from an evolutionary perspective. The above results may provide a fresh perspective for government.

Key words: third party international environmental audit, government regulation, strategy options, evolutionary game, environment pollution

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