基于Shapley值法的商务模式创新价值分享

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.018

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 商务模式的价值创造活动正逐步由个体企业的行为演变为主体企业、伙伴和客户的共同努力。只有以合理的价值分享为前提的价值获取才能保证商务模式创新的价值得以持续创造，保证商务模式创新的成功。基于Shapley值法对商务模式创新后的价值增值在主体企业和其他利益相关者之间进行分享，比较各个参与主体价值增值的大小，得到合理价值分享的条件。研究结果表明，对商务模式创新没有直接贡献的利益相关者也可能分享到创新的价值，但不同创新结果价值分享的对象和数量是不一样的，创新结果参数的变化会不同程度影响分享的价值，为了更好地提高各个利益相关者参与创新的积极性，有必要针对不同创新的结果调整分享的价值。

关键词: 商务模式创新, 价值分享, Shapley值

Abstract: The value creation activities of business model are evolving from individual enterprise conduct to the joint efforts of the main enterprise, partners and customers. Only the value acquisition based on reasonable value sharing can guarantee the continuous value creation of business model innovation, and ensure the success of innovation. It is studied in this paper how the value of business model innovation is shared between the main enterprise and various stakeholders, and what are the conditions for reasonable value sharing.
Firstly according to the reference of previous literatures about how the added value of enterprise or business model is measured, this paper proposes the method of measuring the value of business model innovation. Then based on the Shapley value method, the added value after the business model innovation is shared between the main enterprise and other stakeholders. This method considers the amount of contribution of the main enterprise and various stakeholders to the business model innovation, and takes it as the basis of value sharing, which somehow shows the "individual rationality" and "collective rationality" of the value sharing of business model innovation. According to the result of calculation, the amount of the added value gained by the principal enterprise and other stakeholders are compared. Lastly the reasonable conditions for value sharing are also obtained, that is, the relationship between the variables which affect the value sharing(such as the variation of the price that customers pay, or the variation of the capitalised costs that the principal enterprise pay the suppliers or the partners and so on) and the variables of the achievements of the innovation (such as the variation of the capacity of the market, the variation of the price of the product or service, or the variation of the costs of providing its own resources by the principal enterprise in the business model and so on). Above all, this is of some guiding significance for the enterprises to innovate the business models. In order to improve the enthusiasm of all stakeholders to participate in innovation, it is necessary to adjust the parameters that affect value sharing according to different innovation results.
The results show that, the stakeholders who have no direct contribution to business model innovation may also share the value of innovation, however, the objects and quantities of value sharing are different based on different innovation results. The change of innovation result parameters will affect the sharing value in different extent. In order to improve the enthusiasm of all stakeholders to participate in the innovation, it is necessary to adjust the sharing value to the results of different innovations. Only with the reasonable value sharing, the value of business model innovation can be realized better through the joint promotion of each participant in the innovation value network. This research makes up for the research gap of value sharing in business model innovation.

Key words: business model innovation, value sharing, Shapley value

中图分类号:

F270

吴隽, 徐迪. 基于Shapley值法的商务模式创新价值分享[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(6): 191-205.

WU Jun, XU Di. Value Sharing of Business Model Innovation Based on Shapley Value[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(6): 191-205.

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