主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (8): 161-173.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1736

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

供应链中纵向信息获取和横向信息共享策略研究

吴江华1, 姜帆2   

  1. 1. 中国人民大学商学院, 北京 100872;
    2. 河北农业大学经济管理学院, 河北 保定 071000
  • 收稿日期:2018-12-06 修回日期:2019-05-07 出版日期:2021-08-20 发布日期:2021-08-13
  • 通讯作者: 姜帆(1989-),女(汉族),河北涿鹿人,河北农业大学经济管理学院,副教授,研究方向:运营和供应链管理,E-mail:jiangfan_rbs@ruc.edu.cn. E-mail:jiangfan_rbs@ruc.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    北京市自然科学基金资助项目(9212010);河北农业大学引进人才资助项目(YJ2021001)

Vertical Information Acquisition and Horizontal Information Sharing Strategy in a Supply Chain

WU Jiang-hua1, JIANG Fan2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Hebei Agricultural University, Baoding 071000, China
  • Received:2018-12-06 Revised:2019-05-07 Online:2021-08-20 Published:2021-08-13

摘要: 研究由一个制造商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链中,零售商之间的横向信息共享策略和制造商的信息获取以及最优定价问题。在模型中,制造商同时为两家零售商提供等价商品,零售商向消费者销售商品且进行价格竞争。以Bertrand博弈为研究手段,求解了零售商的均衡销售价格、订货量决策和信息共享策略,制造商的最大利润和最优批发价格,以及供应链利润。分析比较了在制造商不同的信息获取策略下,零售商、制造商和供应链的利润。研究表明,零售商之间完全信息共享始终为占优策略。但制造商获取下游信息时会使得自身利润增加,零售商利润减少,因此零售商不会主动把信息共享给制造商。考虑到下游的边界均衡解,供应链的利润变化还与市场的不确定性和产品的替代性有关。当产品替代性较高或产品替代率较低且市场的不确定性处于中间水平时,制造商获取信息后供应链利润增加,此时制造商可以用部分增加的利润成功购买零售商信息。该模型为上游制造商提供了最优定价和信息获取策略,也为下游零售商提供了求解自身最优销售价格、订货量和信息共享决策的方法。

关键词: 供应链管理, 信息共享, 信息获取, 市场不确定性, 产品的替代性, 纳什均衡

Abstract: It is commonly observed that a significant amount of information is being exchanged between suppliers and manufacturers, between manufacturers and retailers, between retailers and consumers, and also among competitors to gain competitive advantage. Many papers investigate horizontal information sharing among competitors in a one-level market in the absence of considering interactions between vertical parties. Most supply chains literatures study vertical information, in which horizontal information sharing is not considered. Some literatures in vertical information sharing considering horizontal competition show that downstream firms have no incentives to share information with the upstream firm voluntarily. If the upstream firm with more downstream firms' information is better off, the upstream can take the initiative to acquire information and share partial profit with downstream to incentive them to share information. However, the effect of vertical information acquisition on horizontal competitors' information exchange strategy is unclear. Therefore, the present study focuses on the incentives of information acquisition with horizontal information sharing in a supply chain environment. In this paper, the information acquisition, horizontal information sharing strategy and optimal pricing in a two-echelon supply chain, which consists of one upstream manufacturer and two downstream retailers are studied. The manufacturer offers same wholesale price to both retailers, and retailers are engaged in a Bertrand (price) competition by selling substitutable products. By constructing a Bertrand competition model, equilibrium order quantity and information sharing strategy for retailers are solved and the profit of the manufacturer, retailers and supply chain under different information acquisition strategies is analyzed and compared. In numerical study, an algorithm is developed to derive manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and the optimal profit of manufacturer, retailers and supply chain by using a Mathematica program. The study shows that full information sharing is retailers' dominant strategy. However, if downstream retailers share information with the manufacturer, the manufacturer will be better off but retailers will be worse off. Thus, there is no incentive for retailers to share information with upstream manufacturer voluntarily. Considering boundary equilibrium of retailers, it is shown that market variation and product substitutability play a significant role in supply chain's profit. When product substitutability is low, with information acquisition, the supply chain is better off and manufacturer can share partial profit with retailers to acquire retailers' information if the market variation is intermediate. When product substitutability is large enough, the supply chain is always better off with information acquisition. Moreover, it is shown that information acquisition strategy can be reversed when demand variation is intermediate or some equilibrium solutions are binding on zero. The model provides upstream manufacturer with optimal pricing and information acquisition strategies, as well as ways for downstream retailers to solve their own optimal sales prices, order quantities, and information sharing strategy.

Key words: supply chain management, information sharing, information acquisition, market uncertainty, product substitutability, Nash equilibrium

中图分类号: