管理层股权激励与企业未来盈余定价——来自中国资本市场的证据

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1375

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文探讨管理层股权激励对企业未来盈余定价的影响，并进一步将企业未来盈余分解为行业成分和公司特质成分，考察股权激励对不同成分未来盈余定价的影响，以及不同模式股权激励对上述关系影响的差异。利用实施股权激励的中国A股上市公司2006-2016年间的数据，本文发现：（1）股权激励提高了当期股票收益率与企业未来盈余的相关性。说明管理层股权激励有助于投资者对企业未来盈余定价；（2）管理层股权激励并不影响投资者对行业成分未来盈余定价，但会加速投资者对公司特质未来盈余定价；（3）管理层的股票型激励有助于投资者对企业未来盈余定价，同时也能加速投资者对公司特质未来盈余定价，但股票期权激励并无上述作用。研究结果意味着，整体而言股权激励能够缓解管理层与股东之间信息披露的代理问题，激励管理层向外部投资者披露更多高质量的公司基本面信息，从而降低投资者对公司特质未来盈余信息的搜寻成本，最终通过加速公司特质未来盈余信息融入股价来促进投资者对企业未来盈余定价。本文揭示了管理层股权激励促进投资者对企业未来盈余定价的微观机制，同时，研究结论对提高中国证券市场的信息效率提供了重要的理论参考。

关键词: 股权激励, 未来盈余定价, 公司特质未来盈余, 行业成分未来盈余

Abstract: Classic asset pricing theory equate stock prices with the present value of expected future dividends, discounted at appropriate discount rates. Hence, in an efficient stock market, prices change to reflect revisions in the investors' expectations about firms' future earnings. Whether firms' future earnings are fully impounded into the current stock prices depends on investors' ability to predict it. Prior studies have shown that firm's disclosure activity significantly affect investors' ability to predict future earnings, specifically, firms with relatively higher earnings quality and more informative voluntary disclosures assist investors in better pricing future earnings.
Meanwhile, firm's disclosure activity is affected by managerial equity incentives (MEIs). On the one hand, equity incentives can improve the firms' earnings quality and encourage managers to voluntarily provide additional private information to the market. On the other hand, equity incentives can induce managers to manipulate their firms' earnings and voluntary disclosure in order to maximize their remuneration. If equity incentives encourage managers to provide higher quality earnings or more informative voluntary disclosure to the market, investors will be better able to predict future earnings. In contrast, if equity incentives induce managers to manipulate their firms' earnings and voluntary disclosure, it will be difficult for investors to predict future earnings. Which effect dominates in a cross-sectional setting is an unanswered, empirical question that this paper investigate.
Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies that implemented equity incentives during 2006-2016, it is found that MEIs strengthens the association between current returns and future earnings, indicating that MEIs help investors to better price firms' future earnings. By decomposing future earnings into industry-wide and firm-specific components, it is found that MEIs do not influence investors pricing industry-wide component of future earnings, but it accelerate the pricing of firm-specific future earnings. In addition, managerial stock incentives help investors to better price future earnings and accelerate the pricing of firm-specific future earning, but option incentives do not. This paper offers two main contributions. First, it reveals the micro-mechanism that how MEIs assist investors in better pricing future earnings. Second, given that investor's ability to price future earnings reflects the information efficiency of the stock market, it provides an important theoretical reference for regulators to improve the information efficiency of Chinese stock market.

Key words: equity incentives, the pricing of future earnings, firm-specific future earnings, industry-wide component of future earnings

中图分类号:

F830.91

付强, 扈文秀, 章伟果. 管理层股权激励与企业未来盈余定价——来自中国资本市场的证据[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(1): 19-31.

FU Qiang, HU Wen-xiu, ZHANG Wei-guo. Managerial Equity Incentives and the Pricing of Firms’ Future Earnings——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Capital Markets[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(1): 19-31.

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