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中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (3): 49-58.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.03.006

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择

刘银国1, 孙慧倩1, 王烨2, 古柳3   

  1. 1. 合肥工业大学管理学院, 安徽 合肥 230009;
    2. 南京审计大学会计学院, 江苏 南京 211815;
    3. 无锡太湖学院会计学院, 江苏 无锡 214000
  • 收稿日期:2015-04-15 修回日期:2016-02-03 出版日期:2017-03-20 发布日期:2017-05-27
  • 通讯作者: 刘银国(1965-),男(汉族),安徽阜阳人,合肥工业大学管理学院博士生导师,管理学博士,安徽财经大学教授、研究生处处长,研究方向:公司财务与公司治理,E-mail:lyg4536@126.com.
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金一般资助项目(13BJY013);国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71172190)

Performance-based Equity Incentive and the Choice of Earnings Management Modes

LIU Yin-guo1, SUN Hui-qian1, WANG Ye2, GU Liu3   

  1. 1. School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China;
    2. School of Accountancy, Nanjing Audit University, Naijing 211815, China;
    3. School of Accountancy, Taihu University of Wuxi, Wuxi 214000, China
  • Received:2015-04-15 Revised:2016-02-03 Online:2017-03-20 Published:2017-05-27

摘要: 本文以2006-2012年期间实施行股权激励计划的A股上市公司为研究样本,对业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择之间的关系进行了实证分析。研究发现,相对于"非激励性"股权激励计划的公司,"激励性"股权激励计划的公司实施真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理的程度更大;上市公司股权激励计划所设定的行权业绩条件相对于公司过去实际业绩水平越严格的,管理层实施真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理的程度越大;为了达到行权业绩条件,上市公司管理层会同时综合使用真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理两种方式。研究结果意味着,合理设定行权业绩条件对于股权激励有效性至关重要,过高或过低的行权业绩条件都难以实现股权激励的预期效果。本文主要贡献在于:根据行权业绩条件高低衡量股权激励强度,是基于中国情景对股权激励强度度量的一个创新;从真实活动盈余管理和应计项目盈余管理两种盈余管理方式选择的角度丰富有关股权激励与盈余管理之间关系方面的文献。

关键词: 业绩型股权激励, 可行权业绩条件, 真实活动盈余管理, 应计项目盈余管理

Abstract: Using the samples of listed companies in Chinese A share market which implemented equity incentive plans during the 2006-2012, and using the difference between the rights vesting performance requirements is set in equity incentive plan and company's past actual performance level to measure the independent variables, this paper investigates the relationship between performance-based equity incentive and the choice of earnings management modes. This paper finds that:the degree of real earnings management which implemented by the company with a "incentive" equity incentive plan is greater than the one which implemented by the company with a "non-incentive" equity incentive plan. The higher the exercise rights vesting performance requirements compared to company's past actual performance level is, the greater the extent of real earnings management induced is. In order to achieve the exercise rights vesting performance requirements, the listing corporation's managements will comprehensively use real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. The results show that, it is very important to set reasonably performance indicators level in the equity incentive plans, and too high or too low performance indicators level would make the equity incentive effect run counter to our desire. The main contribution of the paper is that equity incentive intensity is measured according to exercise rights vesting performance requirements which is an innovation based on Chinese situation, and that the literature about the relation between equity incentives and earnings management are enriched from the perspective of real activities earnings management and the comprehensive use of real and accrued earnings management.

Key words: performance-based equity incentive, exercise rights vesting performance requirements, real earnings management, accrual-based earnings management

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