Abstract:

Under the dual carbon policy， new energy vehicles are accelerating to replace traditional fuel vehicles， and the fierce competition in the new energy vehicle market also makes manufacturers constantly seek product differentiation， and then influence consumers' choice of products through different advertising strategies. To this end， the competition of advertising positioning strategies between new energy vehicle manufacturers in a duopoly is studied. By establishing a decision model of two advertising strategy： the low-carbon based and the intelligent based one， by using the optimal control and differential game method， then it is obtained， under the equal and non-equal power， the two optimal advertising investment levels of two new energy vehicle manufacturers over time.The main results indicate that， in the case of the equal power of two new energy vehicle manufacturers， the optimal low-carbon based advertising effectiveness levels gradually decrease over time； The sales rate of the smaller new energy vehicle manufacturer increases over time； For the larger new energy vehicle manufacturer， the sales rate depends on its share and market expansion； The optimal level of intelligent based advertising increases over time in the initial stage； Additionally， for the larger manufacturer， the optimal low-carbon based advertising effectiveness level decreases more fastly than the optimal intelligent based advertising.In the case of the non-equal power： when two new energy vehicle manufacturers have equal initial sales， the difference is reflected in the effectiveness of intelligent based advertising. The stronger new energy vehicle manufacturer has the better initial intelligent based advertising effectiveness， while weaker one remains unchanged in intelligent based advertising， but later the two manufacturers have a faster decline in effectiveness； If the strong new energy vehicle manufacturer has high initial sales， the effectiveness difference in the intelligent based advertising between two new energy vehicle manufacturers is not significant， and yet the effect of intelligent based advertising decreases slowly in the early stage； If there is a significant difference in initial sales， the intelligent based advertising effect of the weaker one in the initial stage is much higher than that of its competitors， but the intelligent based advertising effect of the stronger manufacturer subsequently surpasses that of the weaker one.The relevant results of this study can provide a reference and decision-making for new energy vehicle manufacturers to invest in low-carbon and intelligent based advertising under the different powers and different stages.

Key words: new energy vehicles, intelligent based advertisement, low-carbon based advertisement, differential game, optimal control, decision making