应急物资分配数量差异与人口统计学因素对灾民公平感知的影响

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2670

Abstract

Abstract:

The fair allocation of the emergency supplies is one of the most important concerns of victims after the occurrence of disasters. A fair allocation not only helps calm down the victims and keep the order in disaster-affected areas， but also avoids the waste of emergency resources. However， a fair allocation does not mean giving the exact same amount of relief supplies to each victim. Instead， decision-makers should consider the demand and preferences of victims and make allocations based on them. Hence， in this paper， the authors adopt inequity aversion as the measurement of fairness from the perspective of ‘people-centered’， which avoids the situation that decisions made are not in line with the reality. Inequity aversion is a widely studied concept in economics and social psychology， which mainly measures the degree that people dislike inequal allocation. Through online investigation， the factors that might have impacts on the fair perceptions of victims are analyzed. It is found：（1） Quantitative differences in the allocation of emergency supplies， the income， gender， education and age of victims have significant impacts on the inequity aversion of victims. （2） When the quantitative differences are small， the social factors （the gender， income， age and education of victims） do not have significant impacts on the inequity aversion of victims. However， with the increase of the quantitative differences， the impacts will gradually become significant. Based on the result of analysis， suggestions are provided to decision-making of resource allocation in emergency logistics， which helps mitigate the impact of negative emotions of victims on the relief operations.

Key words: emergency logistics, relief items allocation, inequity aversion

CLC Number:

C939

Jianfang Shao,Yu Fan,Xihui Wang, et al. The Impact of Emergency Supplies Quantitative Differences and Social Factors on the Fair Perceptions of Victims: An Empirical Study[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(8): 189-197.

Figures/Tables 5

References 45

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变量类别	变量名称	变量说明
因变量	不公平厌恶	连续型变量
自变量	分配数量差异	连续性变量，取值为1，2，3，4，5，6
控制变量	性别	取值分别为1和2
	年龄	5种分类，取值分别为1，2，3，4，5
	收入	5种分类，取值分别为1，2，3，4，5
	受教育程度	5种分类，取值分别为1，2，3，4，5

类别	类别	占比（%）	类别	选项	频率(%)
性别	男	49.9	教育	初中及以下	6.8
	女	50.1		普高/中专/技校/职高	8.8
年龄	0-20岁	4.4		专科	10.3
	21-30岁	34.1		本科	60.8
	31-40岁	20.7		硕士及以上	13.4
	41-50岁	23.3	收入	0~1000元	4.8
	51以上	17.6		1001~3000元	15.6
				3001~5000元	19.1
				5001~10000元	40.9
				10000元以上	19.6

分配数量差异	样本量	最大值	平均值	标准差	中位数	下四分位数	上四分位数
1	546	1000	22.08	90.35	5	3	10
2	546	2400	42.86	180.08	10	6	20
3	546	4000	62.70	258.21	15	9	31.25
4	546	7000	85.63	381.88	20	12	50
5	546	11000	118.93	586.03	25	15	60
6	546	16000	152.57	790.30	30	18	82.50

变量	1	2	3	4	5	6
1不公平厌恶	1
2分配数量差异	0.097^**	1
3性别	0.039^*	0	1
4年龄	0.080^**	0	-0.007	1
5收入	0.027	0	-0.098^**	0.179^**	1
6受教育程度	-0.113^**	0	-0.048^**	-0.404^**	0.347^**	1

变量	系数	t值	变量	系数	t值
分配数量差异	25.859^**	5.679	3001~5000元	-123.776^**	-4.500
性别	35.625^*	2.259	5001~10000元	-93.500^**	-4.144
0~20岁	59.745	1.289	初中	276.072^**	6.363
21~30岁	-1.275	-.048	普高/中专/技校/职高	75.097	1.949
31~40岁	-42.687	-1.496	专科	141.310^**	4.002
41~50岁	48.265	1.874	本科	39.044	1.559
0~1000元	-170.022^**	-3.898	常量	-43.721	-1.038
1001~3000元	-110.594^**	-3.594	R²	0.042

The Impact of Emergency Supplies Quantitative Differences and Social Factors on the Fair Perceptions of Victims: An Empirical Study

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