产业学院组织合法性溢出的RDEU博弈模型分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1554

Abstract

Abstract:

The organizational legitimacy spillover of industrial colleges refers to the gradual accumulation of legitimacy of their organizational structure as the scale expands. Incorporating risk preference to explore organizational legitimacy spillover， introducing rank-dependent expected utility functions to measure corporate risk preference， and performing nonlinear transformations on the probabilities of utility outcomes after ranking through decision weights， thereby constructing an RDEU game model. The existence conditions of the game equilibrium for leading and following enterprises under different risk preferences and the influence laws of the risk characteristics of both parties on the equilibrium are analyzed in this model. It is found that when the benefits are greater than the costs， regardless of the risk preference， there exist pure strategy equilibria of “sharing” and “imitating” which are conducive to promoting the legitimacy spillover of industrial colleges； when the benefits are less than the costs， the risk attributes have a significant impact on the game equilibrium. Specifically， when the leading enterprise is rational， the following enterprise determines the unique equilibrium solution based on the risk attributes of the leading enterprise. Similarly， the leading enterprise will also change its own decisions based on the risk attributes and decisions of the following enterprise. If the following enterprise is risk-averse， the leading enterprise tends to choose the “sharing” strategy； if the following enterprise is risk-seeking， the leading enterprise tends to choose the “precautionary” strategy. When both are irrational， being risk-averse is conducive to advancing the legitimacy spillover of industrial colleges， while being risk-seeking hinders it. When one is risk-averse and the other is not， the equilibrium of the latter is greater than that when both are rational. Based on this， relevant countermeasures and suggestions are proposed from the perspective of risk preference to promote the legitimacy spillover of industrial colleges， in the hope of providing a reference for advancing the high-quality development of industrial colleges.

Key words: Industry College, legitimacy spillover, rank-dependent expected utility, game theory model, Nash equilibrium

CLC Number:

G647

Huifeng Jiang,Yiping Liu. The RDEU Game Model Analysis of Legitimacy Spillover of the Industrial College[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(8): 280-291.

Figures/Tables 14

模型参数	参数含义
$p$	先行企业选择分享策略的概率， $0 ≤ p ≤ 1$
$q$	追随企业选择效仿策略的概率， $0 ≤ p ≤ 1$
$R 1$	原有的可盈利空间
$R 2$	共建产业学院后，额外拓展的盈利空间， $R 2 ≪ R 1$
$c$	共建产业学院的投入成本
$a$	追随企业所占市场份额是先行企业的 $1 / a$ ， $a 1$
$b$	市场份额损失比例， $0 b ≪ 1$
$r$	风险偏好指数

先行

企业

追随企业

效仿

q

观望

1 - q

$p$

a (R 1 + R 2) a + 1 -

R 1 + R 2 a + 1 -

(a + b) R 1 a + 1 -

c，

(1 - b) R 1 a + 1

防范

$1 - p$

(a - b) R 1 a + 1

，

(1 + b) R 1 a + 1 -

a a + 1 R 1

，

1 a + 1 R 1

先行企业得益 $x i$	先行企业概率 $p i$	先行企业秩 $R P i$	先行企业 $决策权重$ $π (x i)$
$a (R 1 + R 2) a + 1 -$ c	$p q$	$1$	$ω A (p q)$
$(a + b) R 1 a + 1 - c$	$p (1 - q)$	$1 - p q$	$ω A (p) - ω A (p q)$
$a a + 1 R 1$	$(1 - p) (1 - q)$	$1 - p$	$ω A (1 - q + p q) - ω A (p)$
$(a - b) R 1 a + 1$	$(1 - p) q$	$(1 - p) q$	$1 - ω A (1 - q + p q)$

追随企业得益 $x i$	追随企业概率 $p i$	追随企业秩 $R P i$	追随企业 $决策权重$ $π (x i)$
$R 1 + R 2 a + 1 -$ c	$p q$	$1$	$ω B (p q)$
$(1 + b) R 1 a + 1 -$ c	$(1 - p) q$	$1 - p q$	$ω B (q) - ω B (p q)$
$1 a + 1 R 1$	$(1 - p) (1 - q)$	$1 - q$	$ω B (1 - p + p q) - ω B (q)$
$(1 - b) R 1 a + 1$	$p (1 - q)$	$p (1 - q)$	$1 - ω B (1 - p + p q)$

先行企业得益 $x i$	先行企业概率 $p i$	先行企业秩 $R P i$	先行企业 $决策权重 π (x i)$
$a a + 1 R 1$	$(1 - p) (1 - q)$	$1$	$ω A [(1 - p) (1 - q)]$
$(a + b) R 1 a + 1 - c$	$p (1 - q)$	$P + q - p q$	$ω A (1 - q) - ω A (1 - p) (1 - q)$
$a (R 1 + R 2) a + 1 -$ c	$p q$	$q$	$ω A (1 - q + p q) - ω A (1 - q)$
$(a - b) R 1 a + 1$	$(1 - p) q$	$(1 - p) q$	$1 - ω A (1 - q + p q)$

追随企业得益 $x i$	追随企业概率 $p i$	追随企业秩 $R P i$	追随企业 $决策权重 π (x i)$
$1 a + 1 R 1$	$(1 - p) (1 - q)$	$1$	$ω B [(1 - p) (1 - q)]$
$(1 + b) R 1 a + 1 -$ c	$(1 - p) q$	$q + p - p q$	$ω B (1 - p) - ω B (1 - p) (1 - q)$
$R 1 + R 2 a + 1 -$ c	$p q$	$p$	$ω B (1 - p + p q) - ω B (1 - p)$
$(1 - b) R 1 a + 1$	$p (1 - q)$	$p (1 - q)$	$1 - ω B (1 - p + p q)$

$c$	$R 2$	$a$	$R 1$	$b$
1.6	1.5	2	1700	0.0021

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The RDEU Game Model Analysis of Legitimacy Spillover of the Industrial College

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