Abstract:

Nowadays， low-carbon development has become a global consensus. America， Japan， European Union have all committed to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050， and China also pledged at the 75th Session of The United Nations General Assembly to strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. This paper focuses on the carbon neutrality in supply chain which is triggered by the following three factors： Firstly， government subsidies for firms to reduce carbon emissions can provide incentives for firms to reduce the negative externalities on the environment. Secondly， the environmental protection awareness for consumers is gradually increasing， and they tend to buy environmentally products even if they are more expensive than ordinary products. Thirdly， supply chain sides also actively cooperate to enhance consumers’ low-carbon preferences. Scholars have conducted researches on carbon emission reduction and carbon trading， the research gaps on the carbon neutrality in supply chain is obvious.This paper explores a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer， where the manufacturer endeavors to achieve net-zero carbon emission production by carbon emission reduction and carbon absorption， the retailer impacts consumers’ preference for carbon-neutral products by publicity and promotion. Government participate in the carbon neutrality by subsidies or interventions. Accordingly， we build a double differential game model， and comparatively analyze the decentralized decision-making without government subsidies （Scenario N）， decentralized decision-making with government subsidies （Scenario S）， centralized decision-making with government subsidies （Scenario C）， and the two-way cost-sharing contract under the government intervention （Scenario I）. The results show that Scenario S is the optimal choice for the carbon neutrality in supply chain. The natural attenuation rate has a negative impact on consumers’ preference for carbon neutrality products， product carbon neutrality level and supply chain profits， while parametters such as the influence coefficient of effort level， consumers' preference for carbon-neutral products， and the impact coefficient of product carbon neutrality level on market demand have a positive influence. with the introduction of government's role， the effort levels of carbon emission reduction and marketing changes from being positively affected by its own marginal profit to being positively also affected by the other party's marginal profit. Government needs to provide some subsidies to optimize the profits of both parties in supply chain in scenarios I and S. Whether government provide direct subsidies or intervenes in the supply chain， which can increase consumer preference for carbon neutrality products and their carbon neutrality level.Some management implications are revealed as follows. Firstly， Scenario S is the preferred choice for supply chain carbon neutrality， and the relevant influencing factors should be clarified in practice to help Scenario S to carry out smoothly. Secondly， government should actively participate in the carbon neutrality in supply chain to provide the supply chain parties with a good market expectation. Finally， supply chain carbon neutrality is affected by different factors， in practice， we should clarify the influence mechanism of the relevant factors to provide a support for the realization of the carbon neutrality in supply chain， to realize the “win-win” situation in economic and environmental benefits.

Key words: Supply carbon neutrality, Decision model, Government participation, Double differential game