政府动态奖惩机制下中小型制造企业绿色转型研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0001

Abstract

Abstract:

Under the global climate change and China’s “dual-carbon” policy background， it delves into the critical issue of promoting the green transformation of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises （SMEs）， and constructs a two-player evolutionary game model involving local governments and SMEs to explore the complex interplay of factors influencing green transformation in this study. The model incorporates key parameters such as cost differences， reward intensity， and punishment intensity， as well as the probability of local government supervision and the probability of SMEs' active participation in green transformation. It is revealed that under static reward-punishment mechanisms， no evolutionarily stable strategy （ESS） exists， highlighting the superiority of dynamic mechanisms. It also demonstrates that the cost difference is negatively correlated with the probability of SMEs actively participating in green transformation and positively correlated with the probability of local government supervision. Importantly， it is found that increasing the intensity of punishments for inactive participation in green transformation has a more pronounced effect on achieving a coordinated and stable state of green transformation than increasing rewards for active participation. These findings underscore the importance of dynamic reward-punishment mechanisms in incentivizing and regulating the behavior of SMEs and local governments， thereby fostering sustainable green transformation. Through numerical simulations， the theoretical model is validated and a visual representation of the evolutionary paths under different reward-punishment mechanisms is provided. The results show that dynamic reward-punishment mechanisms， particularly those that adjust rewards and punishments based on the strategies chosen by SMEs， are more effective in achieving a stable state of green transformation. It not only contributes to the existing literature on green transformation and evolutionary game theory but also offers practical insights for policymakers in designing effective incentive mechanisms to promote sustainable development among SMEs in this research.

Key words: dual-carbon policy, small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, green transformation, dynamic reward-punishment mechanism, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F272

Shuyu Shao,Qing Wang,Yan Liu. Green Transformation of Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturing Enterprises under the Dynamic Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(8): 269-279.

Figures/Tables 13

参数	含义
$x / (1 - x)$	地方政府选择积极监管/消极监管的概率， $x ∈ (0,1)$
$y / (1 - y)$	中小型制造企业选择协同绿色转型/不协同绿色转型的概率 $y ∈ (0,1)$
$C 1$	地方政府选择绿色转型监管时产生的成本
$R 1$	地方政府选择绿色转型监管时产生的收益
$C 2$	中小型制造企业选择积极参与绿色协同转型产生的成本
$R 2$	中小型制造企业选择积极参与绿色转型协同产生的收益
$C 3$	中小型制造企业选择消极参与绿色协同转型产生的成本
$R 3$	中小型制造企业选择消极参与绿色转型协同产生的收益
$L$	中小型制造企业不选择协同绿色转型时给地方政府带来的政绩及公信损失
$P$	地方政府积极监管时给予积极参与绿色转型协同的中小型制造企业的奖励
$E$	地方政府积极监管时给予消极参与绿色协同转型的中小型制造企业的惩罚

参与博弈方		地方政府
参与博弈方		积极监管 $x$	消极监管 $1 - x$
中小型制造企业	积极参与绿色协同转型 $y$	$R 1 - C 1 - P$	$R 1 - C 1$
	积极参与绿色协同转型 $y$	$R 2 - C 2 + P$	$R 2 - C 2$
	消极参与绿色协同转型 $1 - y$	$R 1 - C 1 - L + E$	$R 1 - C 1 - L$
	消极参与绿色协同转型 $1 - y$	$R 3 - C 3 - E$	$R 3 - C 3$

均衡点	$D e t (J)$	符号	$T r (J)$	符号	稳定性
$O (0,0)$	$- E (C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2)$	-	$E + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3$	不确定	鞍点
$A (0,1)$	-E(P+E+C₃-C₂+R₂-R₃)	-	$P + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3$	不确定	鞍点
$B (1,0)$	$- P (C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2)$	-	$- P + C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2$	不确定	鞍点
$C (1,1)$	$- P (E + P + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3)$	-	$- E + C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2$	不确定	鞍点
$D (x , y )$		+		0	中心点

均衡点	$D e t (J)$	符号	$T r (J)$	符号	局部稳定性
$O (0,0)$	$- E (C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2)$	-	$E + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3$	不确定	鞍点
$A (0,1)$	$- E (P + E + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3)$	-	$P + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3$	不确定	鞍点
$B (1,0)$	$- P (C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2)$	-	$C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2$	-	不稳定
$C (1,1)$	$- P (P + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3)$	-	$C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2$	+	鞍点
$D (x , y )$		+		-	均衡点

均衡点	$D e t (J)$	符号	$T r (J)$	符号	局部稳定性
$O (0,0)$	$- E (C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2)$	-	$E + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3$	+	鞍点
$A (0,1)$	$- E (E + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3)$	-	$C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3$	-	不稳定
$B (1,0)$	$- P (C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2)$	-	$- P + C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2$	不确定	鞍点
$C (1,1)$	$- P (P + E + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3)$	-	$- E + C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2$	不确定	鞍点
$D (x , y )$		+		+	不稳定

均衡点	$D e t (J)$	符号	$T r (J)$	符号	局部稳定性
$O (0,0)$	$- E (C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2)$	-	$E + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3$	+	鞍点
$A (0,1)$	$- E (E + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3)$	-	$C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3$	-	鞍点
$B (1,0)$	$- P (C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2)$	-	$C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2$	-	鞍点
$C (1,1)$	$- P (P + C 3 - C 2 + R 2 - R 3)$	-	$C 2 - C 3 + R 3 - R 2$	+	鞍点
$D (x , y )$		+		-	稳定点

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Green Transformation of Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturing Enterprises under the Dynamic Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

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