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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 84-98.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.2337

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Personalization Strategy and Welfare Analysis under Personal Data Ownership Allocation in Competitive Markets

Haowen Fan1, Yulin Zhang2()   

  1. 1.Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China
    2.School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China
  • Received:2024-12-24 Revised:2025-07-01 Online:2026-11-25 Published:2026-11-10
  • Contact: Yulin Zhang E-mail:zhangyl@seu.edu.cn

Abstract:

In the era of big data, massive consumer data has emerged as a key driver of productivity growth. Firms deliver personalized value to consumers through data-driven personalized services. Although substantial economic value has been generated from large amounts of individual data through personalization, data privacy concerns associated with it have always been a challenge. The allocation of personal data ownership between firms and end-users is widely recognized as an essential measure to address privacy issues of personalized services. Personal data ownership allocation can change the way firms amass and use individual data. Namely, under stringent privacy regulations, consumers are entitled to choose how much data they want to share with firms. The purpose of this study is to examine how data ownership allocation impacts firms’ personalization strategies in competitive markets with privacy concerns, as well as implications for stakeholders. A game-theoretic model is employed to investigate the personalization strategies of competing firms under different data ownership allocations and address the impact of data ownership allocation on firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Two scenarios are considered: (i) empowering firms with data ownership and (ii) empowering consumers with data ownership. The results reveal that both firms adopt personalized services with firm control over data. However, with consumer control over data, both firms adopt personalized services only if consumer privacy concerns are low and the monetary value of data is high. Assigning data ownership to consumers can mitigate the price competition caused by personalized services; however, firms may end up worse off than when data ownership is assigned to firms themselves. The findings also underscore an autonomy paradox, i.e., empowering consumers to decide how much data to provide for personalized services may not necessarily improve consumer surplus. Assigning data ownership to consumers can improve consumer surplus when consumer privacy concerns are at moderate levels and the monetary value of data is high. This work has implications for firms on personalized service adoption and provides insights for policy makers on the effect of personal data ownership allocation on consumer welfare.

Key words: personalized service, personal data ownership allocation, privacy concerns, data revenue, market competition

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