Abstract:

With the prevalence of sustainable development， finding the balance between economic development and environment pollution is an issue that every enterprise in the supply chain needs to solve. The contradiction between high product green level and high green R&D cost leads to the decrease the enterprises' positivity of green technology R&D and profit. In order to meet the green product demands of consumers， many retailers， such as Walmart， have long been committed to help upstream manufacturers to ease the financial pressure by sharing the green R&D cost， which can encourage manufacturers to improve the level of green technology and realize the rational optimization of the supply chain resource. Considering the green competition， price competition and cooperation between manufacturers and retailers， it is worthwhile to explore how to determine the optimal price and the optimal level of green technology.For the competition of two green supply chains and the sharing cost of manufacturers and retailers， the equilibrium price and the optimal profit of supply chains are studied by using the noncooperative-cooperative biform game in this paper. In the noncooperative game part， choose wholesale price and retail price as strategies， which constitutes the competitive situation. In the cooperative game part， manufacturers and retailers optimize the level of green technology and the sharing proportion of green R&D cost. Two cooperative games are established to describe the competition of supply chains and the cooperation among supply chain members. Shapley value is used to distribute the profit of each supply chain. Based on the profit of the cooperative game， the Nash equilibrium strategy of supply chain members is obtained by constructing the non-cooperative game. The influence of the product green competitive intensity and cross price sensitivity coefficient on equilibrium strategy and optimal profit is analyzed through a numerical example.The results show that the green technology and the profit of supply chain members are positively correlated with the coefficient of green R&D cost. As the product green competitive intensity increases， the profit of supply chain members is reduced. And enterprises will reduce the investment in green technology， which leads to the lower green level of products. However， the product price competition can prompt manufacturers to produce products with high green level and raise product pricing. A new method is provided to study the management for green supply chains with coexistence of competition and cooperation.

Key words: competing supply chains, product green level, green R&D cost-sharing, noncooperative-cooperative biform game, Shapley value