Abstract:

In planning platform-type new product preannouncement information， the market expectations and strategy choices of consumers， developers， and competitors on the platform for new product preannouncement will be directly affected by the release sequence of the previews. A game model construction method is adopted in this paper to construct game models of three types of preannouncement strategies （synchronous， developer-first， and consumer-first） under a duopoly competition. The new product pricing， the number of participants， platform profit， and social welfare Nash equilibrium under different strategies are analyzed. The internal mechanism of the effects of the market expectation multiplier effect， information asymmetry， user preference， and cross-network effect on the selection of preannouncement strategy is studied. The findings show that： 1） when the platform preference of consumers and developers is large or the cross-network effect is small， the synchronous pre-announcement strategy is the platform enterprise's profit-oriented strategy； 2） The profits of platform firms are higher under the asynchronous preannouncement strategy， and it is more beneficial for platform firms to release the information firstly to the users （consumers and developers） with smaller platform preference or cross-network effect when its platform preference intensity or cross-network effect of both users is a medium value. 3） The expected multiplier effect of new product preannouncement is not always beneficial to the growth of platform firms’ profits and total social welfare， the moderate expected multiplier effect is the basic condition for the above three strategies to be adopted， and platform firms will not conduct any new product announcement activities when the expected multiplier effect is sufficiently large.

Key words: releasing sequence, two-sides market, market expectation, network effect, user preference