具有奖励和惩罚机制的最终报价仲裁模型

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1047

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

最终报价仲裁（FOA）是一种常见的具有约束力的第三方冲突解决机制。本文在两人FOA模型中引入了奖励和惩罚机制，探讨这些机制对缓解或解决参与仲裁双方之间冲突的作用。与传统FOA模型不同，具备奖励和惩罚机制的最终报价仲裁模型被视为一个二人非零和博弈模型。本文分析了参与仲裁双方的均衡出价，并得出了纯策略Nash均衡存在及均衡出价收敛的充分条件。研究结果表明，奖励机制和惩罚机制在缓解冲突方面具有显著促进作用；当奖励与惩罚力度足够大时，可以有效推动均衡出价向收敛发展。此外，本文还探讨了四种特殊情况。其中值得注意的是，补贴机制以及带有出价成本的机制被视为特殊类型的奖励—惩罚机制。在具有效用转移特征的补贴机制下，均衡出价的期望值等于双方关于仲裁员公平分配结果的中位数。在胜利者向失败者提供补贴这一情况下，该补贴反而不利于均衡出价收敛。而在失败者向胜利者提供补贴时，当该补贴超过没有任何奖励或惩罚措施下FOA中的均衡出价差的一半时，则能够实现均衡出价收敛。在相同金额对称情况下，失败者向胜利者提供补贴所产生的效果是仅依赖于单一奖赏或处罚措施所能达到效果的两倍。固定的出价成本并不会影响均衡出价，而当出价成本函数呈现线性关系且以出价之差作为自变量时，对称情况下确保均衡出价收敛所需满足条件是成本系数不得低于0.5。本研究为提升现行仲裁程序效率的方法提供了理论基础。

关键词: 最终报价仲裁, 奖励, 惩罚, 补贴, 出价成本

Abstract:

Final offer arbitration （FOA） is a common binding third-party conflict resolution mechanism. In this paper， reward and penalty mechanisms are introduced into a two-player FOA model， and the role of reward and penalty mechanisms in mitigating or resolving the conflict between the parties involved in the arbitration is considered. Unlike the traditional FOA model， the final offer arbitration model with reward and penalty mechanisms is a two-player non-zero-sum game model. The equilibrium bids of the arbitrators are analyzed and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of local equilibrium and the convergence of equilibrium bids. In this paper， it is shown that reward and punishment mechanisms have significant contribution to conflict mitigation， and can effectively promote the convergence of equilibrium bids when the rewards and punishments are sufficiently strong. the subsidy mechanism and the bid-cost mechanism are special reward-punishment mechanisms. In subsidy mechanisms with utility transfers， the mean of the equilibrium bids is the median of the distribution of fair settlements between the parties with respect to the arbitrator. In the winner-loser subsidy mechanism， the presence of subsidies is detrimental to the convergence of equilibrium bids. Under the loser-to-winner subsidy mechanism， the equilibrium bids converge when the subsidy is more than half of the difference between the equilibrium bids in the FOA without incentives or penalties. In the symmetric case， the loser-to-winner subsidy mechanism is twice as effective in converging equilibrium bids as the reward or penalty mechanism alone. The fixed bid cost does not affect the equilibrium bid， but when the bid cost function is a linear function of the bid difference， the equilibrium bid converges if the cost coefficient is not less than 0.5.

Key words: final offer arbitration, rewards, penalties, subsidy, offer cost

中图分类号:

F224.32

刘佳,王先甲. 具有奖励和惩罚机制的最终报价仲裁模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(9): 349-358.

Jia Liu,Xianjia Wang. Final-offer Arbitration with Rewards and Penalties[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(9): 349-358.

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