双重不确定性下企业ESG投入策略：竞争与信号效应

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.2304

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在全球可持续发展的浪潮中，环境、社会和治理（ESG）已经成为企业发展的关键战略要素。鉴于当前经济环境的不确定性特征，以及企业ESG实践中竞争效应与信号效应间的互斥性导致的策略不确定性，本文采用全局博弈构建理论模型，探究环境不确定性和策略不确定性对企业ESG投入的影响路径及其组合效应。结果表明，与直觉不同，环境不确定性能够促进企业进行ESG投入。对企业策略不确定性的效应分解和路径分析发现，当竞争效应较小时，企业只要观察到足够大的收益信号就会进行ESG投入；而当竞争效应较大时，企业的ESG投入策略则取决于所需承担的成本水平，尤其当ESG提升成本处于中间水平时，企业的ESG投入随其获得收益信念的增强先增后减再增，而ESG的信号效应始终对企业ESG投入具有正向的补偿作用，并且消费者学习会正向调节这种补偿效应。另外，政府对企业ESG投入的补贴会增加企业的ESG投入，制定过高的ESG标准则会产生相反的效果。本文的研究结论为政府制定有效的ESG激励机制以及企业开展ESG实践提供了重要的理论参考和实践指导。

关键词: ESG, 不确定性, 全局博弈, 竞争, 信号

Abstract:

Against the backdrop of global sustainable development， companies' environmental， social， and governance （ESG） has become a key strategy for addressing environmental challenges， achieving sustainable development goals， and building long - term competitive advantages.Bearing in mind the uncertainty of the current economic environment， as well as the strategic uncertainty caused by the exclusivity of competitive and signaling effects in corporate ESG practices， a theoretical model is constructed using global games and incorporates higher - order beliefs to capture the “interactive rationality” of strategic interactions between enterprises， examining their ESG investment strategies under environmental and strategic uncertainties.Contrary to traditional Bayesian games where participants' payoffs are independently distributed and fully known， global games relax the assumption that the payoff structures of participants are common knowledge under complete information. Participants cannot accurately estimate the payoffs of the game but receive a noisy private signal about the payoffs， the distribution of which is public information. By combining private and public information to infer others' beliefs， participants assume any payoff is possible before observing the signal. This relaxation ensures a unique equilibrium in noisy games， avoiding the issue of multiple Nash equilibria.The results reveal that， contrary to intuition， environmental uncertainty helps promote corporate ESG investment. The decomposition and path analysis of the effects of strategic uncertainty on corporations show that when the competitive effect is relatively small， companies will invest in ESG as long as they observe a sufficiently high return signal. However， when the competitive effect is significant， a company’s ESG incentive depends on the size of the investment cost. Particularly， when the investment cost is at a medium level， the company's investment incentive fluctuates in an “N” shape as its return belief increases. Additionally， the signaling effect of ESG provides a constant compensatory role in corporate investment incentives， and consumer learning positively moderates this compensatory effect. Moreover， government subsidies for corporate ESG investments increase the incentive for companies to invest in ESG， while the establishment of higher environmental quality standards has the opposite effect. The conclusions of this study have significant theoretical and practical implications for the government in formulating effective ESG incentive mechanisms and related supporting policies.

Key words: ESG, uncertainty, global game, competitive effect, signal effect

中图分类号:

F224

刘婧玲,史雨心,刘家国. 双重不确定性下企业ESG投入策略：竞争与信号效应[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(10): 350-361.

Jingling Liu,Yuxin Shi,Jiaguo Liu. Corporate ESG Investment Strategies under Dual Uncertainties: Competition and Signaling Effects[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(10): 350-361.

图/表 3

表1

参数及其含义"

符号	含义	符号	含义
a_i	(=0,1)，1表示投入ESG，0表示不投入ESG	$θ$	ESG投入的基础收益
x_i	企业i关于 $θ$ 的私人信号	α( $∈$ [0,1])	市场中企业投入ESG的比率
$π i (θ, α)$	企业i关于 $θ$ 的期望收益	b(≥0)	竞争强度，表征竞争效应大小
$u i (x i)$	企业i关于x_i 的期望收益	$m$	ESG信号作用大小
ε_i	x_i 的噪声因子，均匀分布于[-ε，ε]	r(>0)	消费者学习能力
$f$	ESG投入成本

表1

图1

图2

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