关键词: ESG, 不确定性, 全局博弈, 竞争, 信号

Abstract: Amidst the global wave of sustainable development, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) has emerged as a key strategic element for corporate growth. Considering the current economic environment's uncertainty and the strategic uncertainty caused by the mutual exclusivity between the competitive effect and the signaling effect of corporate ESG investments, this paper employs a global game theory model to examine the impact pathways and interactions of environmental uncertainty and strategic uncertainty on corporate ESG investment incentives. The results reveal that, contrary to intuition, environmental uncertainty helps promote corporate ESG investment. The decomposition and path analysis of the effects of strategic uncertainty on corporations show that when the competitive effect is relatively small, companies will invest in ESG as long as they observe a sufficiently high return signal. However, when the competitive effect is significant, a company’s ESG incentive depends on the size of the investment cost. Particularly, when the investment cost is at a medium level, the company's investment incentive fluctuates in an "N" shape as its return belief increases. Additionally, the signaling effect of ESG provides a constant compensatory role in corporate investment incentives, and consumer learning positively moderates this compensatory effect. Moreover, government subsidies for corporate ESG investments increase the incentive for companies to invest in ESG, while the establishment of higher environmental quality standards has the opposite effect. The conclusions of this study have significant theoretical and practical implications for the government in formulating effective ESG incentive mechanisms and related supporting policies.

Key words: ESG, Uncertainty, Global game, Competitive effect, Signal effect