引入自愿减排交易机制下的供应链减排策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1047

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为分析碳市场中自愿减排交易机制对供应链减排策略的影响，构建了一个三阶段的供应链减排博弈模型，考虑引入自愿减排交易机制前后，制造商和零售商在无交易契约、成本共担契约和收益共享契约下的减排策略差异，包括减排努力程度、价格、产量和利润等。主要结论如下：（1）在一定条件下，引入自愿减排交易机制对制造商的减排努力程度有正向激励作用；（2）CCER交易价格受购买限制系数和制造商原始单位碳排放量的影响，进而间接影响制造商的减排投资意愿；（3）不论是否引入自愿减排交易机制，收益共享契约总为最优，可以提高制造商的减排努力程度和双方利润，且自愿减排交易机制能有效改善其他减排契约下零售商的利润，对供应链减排有正向调节作用。

关键词: 自愿减排交易机制, CCER, 供应链减排

Abstract:

China's carbon market features two primary trading mechanisms： the mandatory emission reduction mechanism which trades carbon quotas， and the voluntary emission reduction trading mechanism （CCER）. CCER incentivizes various social entities to voluntarily reduce emissions， fostering widespread awareness and contributing to China's goals for green， low-carbon development， and carbon emission reduction. Compared to the established mandatory emission reduction mechanism， the CCER is still in its early stages， particularly concerning the growing trend of supply chain emission reduction cooperation. The impact of the CCER mechanism on the emission reduction strategies of supply chain enterprises still remains uncertain. Given the significant investment， substantial costs and uncertain market returns associated with carbon emission reduction， effective coordination of costs and benefits within the supply chain is crucial for cooperative emission reduction efforts. Hence， it is imperative to investigate the impact of the CCER market's revival on supply chain emission reduction， focusing on cost-sharing and benefit-sharing contracts.To investigate the effects of introducing a voluntary emission reduction trading mechanism in China's carbon market on both emission reduction efforts and enterprise income within the supply chain， a supply chain comprising manufacturers and retailers is examined， and an emission reduction game model is developed， comparing scenarios with and without a voluntary emission reduction trading mechanism. Compared the emission reduction efforts， prices， outputs and profits of the supply chain under three scenarios： No contract， cost-sharing contract and benefit-sharing contract， in the absence of a voluntary emission reduction trading mechanism. This analysis offers enterprises a foundation for decision-making in selecting optimal emission reduction strategies and supply chain cooperation modes amidst the relaunch of the CCER market.Results indicates that， the voluntary emission reduction trading mechanism incentivizes manufacturers to reduce emissions， consequently boosting profits for both manufacturers and retailers under specific conditions. If the CCER trading price falls below the carbon quota trading price， manufacturers may purchase CCER quotas at a lower cost to compensate. Additionally， they can sell surplus carbon quotas in the carbon market， leading them to increase investment in emission reduction to gain a competitive edge. Under these circumstances， the rise in output and demand due to market expansion further motivates manufacturers to invest in emission reduction. Conversely， if the CCER trading price exceeds the carbon quota trading price， the voluntary emission reduction trading mechanism becomes ineffective. In such cases， manufacturers opt out of CCER trading and may fulfill carbon compliance by reducing production or purchasing minimal carbon quotas. Regardless of whether the voluntary emission reduction trading mechanism is implemented， emission reduction efforts and profits are consistently higher under cost-sharing and benefit-sharing contracts compared to scenarios without contracts. Notably， benefit-sharing contracts consistently yield the highest emission reduction efforts and profits， with the added advantage of lower prices. Hence， manufacturers can alleviate compliance pressure and enhance investment motivation for emission reduction by purchasing CCER under specific circumstances. Through the adoption of cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts， manufacturers and retailers can mitigate the adverse effects of the double marginal effect， thereby enhancing the overall emission reduction level of the supply chain. When formulating carbon trading policies， the government can base decisions on the disparity between CCER trading prices and carbon quota trading prices. Additionally， the CCER purchase restriction coefficient and the manufacturer's original unit carbon emissions collectively influence the CCER trading price. The government can adjust the purchase restriction coefficient based on manufacturers' carbon emissions， thereby regulating the CCER trading price.

Key words: voluntary emission reduction trading mechanism, CCER, supply chain emission reduction

中图分类号:

F274

韦铁,马赐铃,谢品, 等. 引入自愿减排交易机制下的供应链减排策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(11): 231-242.

Tie Wei,Ciling Ma,Pin Xie, et al. Exploring Supply Chain Emission Reduction Strategies within Voluntary Emission Reduction Trading Mechanisms[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(11): 231-242.

图/表 9

表1

符号及其含义"

符号	含义
$Q i$	第i个模型下的需求量
$a$	潜在市场规模， $a > 0$
$b$	消费者对价格的敏感系数， $b > 0$
$λ$	减排努力程度对市场需求的正向影响， $λ > 0$
$ε$	减排成本系数， $ε > 0$
$β$	CCER的购买限制系数
$π A i$	第i个模型下制造商的利润
$π B i$	第i个模型下零售商的利润
$π C i$	第i个模型下自愿减排企业的利润
$P c$	制造商在碳市场购买配额的价格
$P r i$	制造商购买CCER的价格
$P a i$	第i个模型下制造商向零售商出售产品的批发价格
$P b i$	第i个模型下的产品价格
$e i$	第i个模型下制造商的减排努力程度
$e 0$	制造商生产单位产品的原始碳排量
$E j$	政府分配给制造商的免费碳配额度
$θ i$	零售商共担成本的比例， $θ i ∈ 0,1$
$η i$	零售商共享收益的比例， $η i ∈ 0,1$
$C r$	自愿减排企业的单位减排成本

表1

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图8

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