主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (9): 272-281.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0688

• • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑消费者退货的电商平台消费信贷服务策略研究

丁龙1, 卞心怡1, 常珊2()   

  1. 1.南京信息工程大学风险治理与应急决策研究院,江苏 南京 210044
    2.湖北经济学院数据智能与知识工程实验室,湖北 武汉 430205
  • 收稿日期:2024-05-03 修回日期:2024-09-28 出版日期:2026-09-25 发布日期:2026-09-01
  • 通讯作者: 常珊 E-mail:changshan33@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    江苏高校哲学社会科学项目(2022SJYB0164);江苏省社会科学项目(23GLC026);国家自然科学基金项目(72401142);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(24YJC630033);湖北省教育厅哲学社科项目(23Q093);湖北省自然科学基金生态环境创新发展联合基金项目(2026AFC1148);湖北经济学院大数据与数字经济研究院开放课题(2024KFYB03)

Consumer Credit Service Strategy of E-commerce Platform with Product Returns

Long Ding1, Xinyi Bian1, Shan Chang2()   

  1. 1.Risk Governance and Emergency Decision Research Institute,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing 210044,China
    2.Laboratory of Data Intelligence and Knowledge Engineering,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China
  • Received:2024-05-03 Revised:2024-09-28 Online:2026-09-25 Published:2026-09-01
  • Contact: Shan Chang E-mail:changshan33@163.com

摘要:

消费信贷服务已成为电商平台吸引消费者、刺激需求的重要策略,但同时也容易诱导消费者盲目冲动消费并导致退货,从而让平台卖家遭受损失为了揭示消费信贷服务和消费者退货在电商平台与制造商决策交互中的作用机制,本文构建由制造商、电商平台和消费者组成的代理型供应链结构,建立考虑消费信贷支付痛感钝化效应和消费者退货影响的需求模型,研究电商平台采用消费信贷服务策略的条件及其对产品定价、市场需求以及企业收益的影响。研究发现:(1)电商平台推出消费信贷服务并非总是对自身有利。具体而言,当期望退货价值损失较低时,电商平台推出消费信贷服务会获益,否则会受损。(2)电商平台推出消费信贷服务时,制造商会借此机会利用价格杠杆从中谋利,导致无法达到刺激需求的效果。(3)消费信贷服务能够实现电商平台、制造商和银行利益的“三赢”,但仅当期望退货价值损失足够低时才能实现。

关键词: 电商平台, 消费信贷服务, 消费者退货, 支付痛感钝化系数, 博弈论

Abstract:

With the standard development of the e-commerce and consumer credit business, many e-commerce platforms have launched consumer credit services. While at the same time, the phenomenon of high returns is particularly prominent. Considering the endogeneity strategy of e-commerce platforms to launch or not launch consumer credit service, a stylized model is conducted, which shows the interaction between product return and consumer credit service strategy by establishing the product return utility decision-making model affected by the coefficient of pain buffering. Then how product return rate and coefficient of pain buffering influence on optimal product pricing, demand, and corporate profits.It is found that 1) Considering product return, it is not always beneficial for e-commerce platform to launch consumer credit service. When the expected return value loss rate is low, it is beneficial for the platform to launch consumer credit service. When the expected return value loss rate is high, it is harmful for the platform to launch consumer credit service; 2) When launching consumer credit service, demand could probably drop. Although the pain buffering effect of consumer credit service could increase consumer purchase intention, its disutility also reduces their purchase intention. At this time, manufacturers also seek opportunities to increase product prices, which may ultimately reduce consumer purchase intention, and this leads to a decrease in product demand; 3) When the expected return value loss rate is low enough, only when the e-commerce platform launches consumer credit services can it achieve a “triple win” for the interests of the platform, manufacturer and bank.

Key words: e-commerce platform, consumer credit service, product returns, coefficient of pain buffering, game theory

中图分类号: