考虑政府参与的供应链碳中和双微分博弈模型研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0372

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

通过建立双微分博弈模型对不考虑政府补贴的分散式决策（N情形）、考虑政府补贴的分散式决策（S情形）、考虑政府补贴的集中式决策（C情形）及政府干预下双向成本分担契约（I情形）进行了比较分析，以揭示供应链碳中和的占优选择及影响因素。研究表明：S情形为供应链碳中和的占优选择；自然衰减率对消费者碳中和产品偏好、产品碳中和水平及供应链利润有负向影响，努力水平的影响系数、消费者的碳中和产品偏好、产品碳中和水平对市场需求量的影响系数等参数有正向影响；伴随政府作用的引入，碳减排与市场推广努力水平从仅受自身边际利润正向影响变为还受到对方边际利润的正向影响。S情形与I情形下政府需给予一定补贴才能实现对供应链双方利润的优化。无论政府以直接补贴的方式还是干预供应链双方合作方式参与供应链碳中和，都能提高消费者碳中和产品偏好与产品碳中和水平。

关键词: 供应链碳中和, 决策模型, 政府参与, 双微分博弈

Abstract:

Nowadays， low-carbon development has become a global consensus. America， Japan， European Union have all committed to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050， and China also pledged at the 75th Session of The United Nations General Assembly to strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. This paper focuses on the carbon neutrality in supply chain which is triggered by the following three factors： Firstly， government subsidies for firms to reduce carbon emissions can provide incentives for firms to reduce the negative externalities on the environment. Secondly， the environmental protection awareness for consumers is gradually increasing， and they tend to buy environmentally products even if they are more expensive than ordinary products. Thirdly， supply chain sides also actively cooperate to enhance consumers’ low-carbon preferences. Scholars have conducted researches on carbon emission reduction and carbon trading， the research gaps on the carbon neutrality in supply chain is obvious.This paper explores a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer， where the manufacturer endeavors to achieve net-zero carbon emission production by carbon emission reduction and carbon absorption， the retailer impacts consumers’ preference for carbon-neutral products by publicity and promotion. Government participate in the carbon neutrality by subsidies or interventions. Accordingly， we build a double differential game model， and comparatively analyze the decentralized decision-making without government subsidies （Scenario N）， decentralized decision-making with government subsidies （Scenario S）， centralized decision-making with government subsidies （Scenario C）， and the two-way cost-sharing contract under the government intervention （Scenario I）. The results show that Scenario S is the optimal choice for the carbon neutrality in supply chain. The natural attenuation rate has a negative impact on consumers’ preference for carbon neutrality products， product carbon neutrality level and supply chain profits， while parametters such as the influence coefficient of effort level， consumers' preference for carbon-neutral products， and the impact coefficient of product carbon neutrality level on market demand have a positive influence. with the introduction of government's role， the effort levels of carbon emission reduction and marketing changes from being positively affected by its own marginal profit to being positively also affected by the other party's marginal profit. Government needs to provide some subsidies to optimize the profits of both parties in supply chain in scenarios I and S. Whether government provide direct subsidies or intervenes in the supply chain， which can increase consumer preference for carbon neutrality products and their carbon neutrality level.Some management implications are revealed as follows. Firstly， Scenario S is the preferred choice for supply chain carbon neutrality， and the relevant influencing factors should be clarified in practice to help Scenario S to carry out smoothly. Secondly， government should actively participate in the carbon neutrality in supply chain to provide the supply chain parties with a good market expectation. Finally， supply chain carbon neutrality is affected by different factors， in practice， we should clarify the influence mechanism of the relevant factors to provide a support for the realization of the carbon neutrality in supply chain， to realize the “win-win” situation in economic and environmental benefits.

Key words: Supply carbon neutrality, Decision model, Government participation, Double differential game

中图分类号:

TP13

郑月龙,张龄月,白春光. 考虑政府参与的供应链碳中和双微分博弈模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(8): 292-304.

Yuelong Zheng,Lingyue Zhang,Chunguang Bai. Double Differential Game Model of the Carbon Neutrality in Supply Chain considering Government Participation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(8): 292-304.

图/表 6

表1

不考虑政府补贴时各决策变量的均衡结果"

	$θ$	$A R$	$G$	$ξ$	$D$	$J M$	$J R$	$J S C$
N情形	2.02	5.26	14.53	2.01	50.60	1674.96	1174.41	2849.37
C情形	2.53	11.58	27.16	2.26	88.74	—	—	4825.97

表1

表2

考虑政府不同参与方式时各决策变量的均衡结果"

	$θ$	$A R$	$G$	$ξ$	$ψ M$	$ψ R$	$D$	$J M$	$J R$	$J S C$
S情形	2.53	11.58	27.16	2.26	0.45	0.55	88.74	2947.22	1957.08	4904.30
C情形	2.53	11.58	27.16	2.26	0	0	88.74	—	—	4825.97
I情形	2.53	11.58	27.16	2.26	0	0	88.74	2337.80	1948.17	4825.97

表2

图1

图2

图3

图4

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