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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (7): 290-299.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0712

• • 上一篇    

成本分担契约下具有双重参考效应的闭环供应链微分博弈

刘浪1,2(), 彭莲怡2, 濮宇涛2, 麻宇腾1   

  1. 1.贵州财经大学工商管理学院,贵州 贵阳 550000
    2.华东交通大学经济管理学院,江西 南昌 330016
  • 收稿日期:2023-04-28 修回日期:2024-01-14 出版日期:2026-07-25 发布日期:2026-06-18
  • 通讯作者: 刘浪 E-mail:liu_lang@hotmail.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72162015);贵州省高校哲学社会科学实验室试点建设项目(黔教哲[2023]02号)

A Closed-loop Supply Chain Differential Game with Dual Reference Effects under Cost-sharing Contracts

Lang Liu1,2(), Lianyi Peng2, Yutao Pu2, Yuteng Ma1   

  1. 1.School of Business Administration of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550000,China
    2.School of Management and Economics,East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang 300013,China
  • Received:2023-04-28 Revised:2024-01-14 Online:2026-07-25 Published:2026-06-18
  • Contact: Lang Liu E-mail:liu_lang@hotmail.com

摘要:

消费者在挑选产品时一般存在各种心理预期。本文考虑消费者决策同时受价格参考效应与绿色度参考效应影响,即消费者做出购买决策前预先给产品设置一个参考价格和参考绿色度。本文以制造商、零售商和回收商组成的闭环供应链为研究对象,建立动态的微分博弈模型,并采用双向成本分担契约进行协调,最后运用数值仿真对结果进行了验证和说明。研究发现:价格参考效应虽然会导致产品零售价和批发价下降,但由于销量的上升,供应链成员仍然可以获利。绿色度参考效应对供应链成员始终有积极影响,其中,对制造商的影响最大。当两种效应同时存在时,价格参考效应对制造商、零售商利润呈现出先抑制后促进的趋势;对回收商始终具有促进作用。双向成本分担契约有效地协调了供应链系统,弱化了分散决策中的双重边际效应,供应链成员利润得到改善。

关键词: 参考效应, 闭环供应链, 双向成本分担契约, 微分博弈

Abstract:

Consumers generally have various mental expectations when selecting a product. If the product meets the mental expectations, consumers will make a purchase decision; otherwise,consumers may give up the purchase. In this paper, it is considered that consumers have both price reference effect and greenness reference effect, i.e., consumers set a reference price and a reference greenness for the products in advance before making purchase decision, and examine whether the green products meet the mental expectations. Firstly, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a recycler is tatken as the research object, and the influence on the pricing decisions of the closed-loop supply chain members when consumers have green preferences and dual reference effects is studied. Then differential game model with dynamic changes in product greenness level is constructed to depict the mechanism of product greenness on each member. Next decentralized decision- making and two-way cost-sharing contract coordination scenarios are also considered. In the contract coordination scenario, manufacturer shares part of the recycling cost and retailer shares part of the green R&D cost to improve the recycling rate of used products and the greenness of green products. Finally, the results are verified and illustrated using numerical simulations. It is found that: 1. Although the price reference effect leads to a decrease in the retail and wholesale prices of the products, the supply chain members can still profit due to the increase in sales volume. And when the price reference effect meets certain conditions, it has a promotional effect on the recycling rate of used products, which has not been mentioned in previous studies.2. When the product’s greenness is greater than the consumer's reference greenness, the greenness reference effect always has a positive impact on supply chain members, among which, the effect on manufacturers is the greatest. When the product greenness is smaller than the consumer's reference greenness, and the greenness reference effect is relatively weak at this time, the manufacturer's profit has a small reduction.3. When both effects exist at the same time, the promotion effect of the greenness reference effect is larger than the price reference effect, and the price reference effect shows a trend of first inhibiting and then promoting the manufacturer's and retailer's profit; it always has a promotion effect on the recycler. 4. The two-way cost contract effectively coordinates the supply chain system, weakens the double marginal effect in decentralized decision-making, and improves the overall economic efficiency of the supply chain. With the increase of manufacturer's cost-sharing, the wholesale price and retail price of the product decrease, and the green input of the product and the greenness of the product increase; with the increase of retailer's cost-sharing, the green input of the product and the greenness of the product have a tendency to grow. Although it leads to a decrease in product price when the manufacturer bears the cost of recycling, it also promotes an increase in recycling rate and sales volume, so the profits of the supply chain members are greater in this case than in the case of decentralized decision making.

Key words: Reference effects, closed-loop supply chains, two-way cost-sharing contracts, differential game

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