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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (6): 331-343.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0530cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0530

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转售、代销还是混合模式?竞争性电商平台销售模式选择

赵玉1, 郑本荣2(), 金亮3   

  1. 1.东华理工大学经济与管理学院,江西 南昌 330013
    2.华中农业大学经济管理学院,湖北 武汉 430070
    3.江西财经大学工商管理学院,江西 南昌 330032
  • 收稿日期:2024-04-08 修回日期:2024-10-23 出版日期:2026-06-25 发布日期:2026-05-22
  • 通讯作者: 郑本荣 E-mail:brzheng@mail.hzau.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72063001);国家自然科学基金项目(72102084);江西省研究生创新专项资金项目(YC2025-B144);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2023JGLW03)

Reselling, Agency Selling, or Hybrid Mode? Sales Mode Selection of Competing E-commerce Platforms

Yu Zhao1, Benrong Zheng2(), Liang Jin3   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management,East China University of Technology,Nanchang 330013,China
    2.College of Economics and Management,Huazhong Agricultural University,Wuhan 430070,China
    3.School of Business Administration,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330032,China
  • Received:2024-04-08 Revised:2024-10-23 Online:2026-06-25 Published:2026-05-22
  • Contact: Benrong Zheng E-mail:brzheng@mail.hzau.edu.cn

摘要:

转售或代理销售渠道选择对电商平台利润及供应链效率具有关键影响。基于供应商和竞争性平台组成的供应链系统,考虑平台之间的权力差异,根据平台的渠道策略(转售或代销)构建4类渠道模式:平台同时采用转售策略(模式RR)、平台PA采用转售而平台PB采用代销策略(模式RA)、平台PA采用代销而平台PB采用转售策略(模式AR)、平台同时采用代销策略(模式AA)。通过均衡比较,得到如下研究结论:首先,平台渠道模式的选择与竞争程度和平台权力相关。当竞争程度较低时,RR模式占优;当竞争程度较高时,AA模式占优;当竞争居中且平台PA的权力较强时,RA模式成为均衡策略。其次,供应商的最优渠道模式与平台存在差异。仅当竞争适度且平台PA的权力较弱时,平台和供应商在RR或AA模式下可能实现共赢。最后,在考虑供应商渠道成本或平台佣金差异情形下,上述结论仍具有稳健性。研究结论对电商平台渠道模式选择及供应商应对策略制定具有重要的管理启示。

关键词: 转售, 代理销售, 平台竞争, 平台权力, 销售模式选择

Abstract:

The rapid development of e-commerce has accelerated the evolution of platform sales modes. Agency selling, a direct sales model for suppliers, can improve channel efficiency through a revenue sharing mechanism. Unlike the traditional reselling mode, where the platforms control the sales price, the agency model allows suppliers to directly set prices while paying a commission to the platform. This mode has been widely adopted by giant platforms such as JD.com and Amazon. However, many manufacturers continue to use the reselling mode. Consequently, it is crucial for platforms to identify which mode is more optimal. Moreover, many platforms often choose different sales modes for the same brand, driven by the intensity of platform competition and platform power difference.Motivated by practical examples that competing platforms adopting different sales modes, a stylized supply chain consisting of one supplier and two competing platforms is analyzed, differentiated by market power. Four distinct channel modes are developed: (a) Mode RR, where both platforms adopt the reselling mode; (b) Mode AA, where both platforms use the agency selling mode; (c)Mode AR, where platform PA adopt the agency selling mode while platform PB uses the reselling mode; and (d)Mode RA, where platform PA adopt the reselling mode while platform PB uses the agency selling mode. The sequence of the game divides into two stages: channel mode selection and pricing stages. In the channel mode selection stage, platforms choose their preferred sales mode. In the pricing stage, the supplier and platforms determine wholesale or retail prices based on the chosen four channel modes. Using backward induction, the equilibrium outcomes are derived and the profits across the four models are compared.The following results are derived. First, the channel mode choice of platforms is influenced by the competition intensity and the platform's market power. When competition is low, RR mode is preferred, while the AA mode becomes optimal under high competition. When competition is moderate and there is a significant power imbalance between platforms, the RA mode becomes the equilibrium strategy. Second, the impact of different channel modes on both the supplier and the platform varies. Under weak competition, the AA mode is more advantageous for the supplier, whereas in highly competitive environments, the RR mode benefits the supplier more. When competition is moderate, the AR mode is optimal for the supplier. Furthermore, under moderate competition, if platform PA holds weaker market power, both the platforms and the supplier can achieve a win-win-win situation under either the RR or AA modes. Third, these findings remain robust even when considering variations in supplier channel costs or differences in platform commissions. Specifically, an increase in supplier channel costs reduces the likelihood of the AA mode being dominant, while a rise in platform PB's commission makes the AA mode more attractive.The research findings offer significant managerial implications for platforms and suppliers. First, platforms should consider three key factors when making channel decisions: the level of competition, the disparity in platform power, and commission. In less competitive markets, platforms benefit more from adopting the reselling mode. However, in a competitive environment, the optimal channel mode for platforms does not necessarily align with maximizing supplier profitability. Therefore, suppliers should adapt their pricing strategies in response to the platforms’ chosen channel mode strategies.

Key words: reselling, agency selling, platform competition, platform power, channel mode selection

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