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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (5): 256-271.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0701cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0701

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考虑客户多归属行为的双边视频平台独家版权决策分析

张诗纯, 陈靖()   

  1. 上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院,上海 201600
  • 收稿日期:2024-05-03 修回日期:2024-08-11 出版日期:2026-05-25 发布日期:2026-04-21
  • 通讯作者: 陈靖 E-mail:02623@shisu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72371166);上海外国语大学导师学术引领计划项目(2024DSYL049)

Exclusive Content Purchasing Decision Analysis in Two-Sided Streaming Media Platform Consider Multi-homing Consumers

Shichun Zhang, Jing Chen()   

  1. SISU School of Business and Management,Shanghai International Studies University,Shanghai 201600,China
  • Received:2024-05-03 Revised:2024-08-11 Online:2026-05-25 Published:2026-04-21
  • Contact: Jing Chen E-mail:02623@shisu.edu.cn

摘要:

为赢得竞争,目前各大视频平台均不断提高自己的独家视频版权数量,以获取差异化竞争优势。然而,独家版权数量的增加催生了观众的多归属行为,改变了平台原有的竞争逻辑。在这样的情况下,盲目提高独家版权数量,实际上是不利于平台盈利的。结合视频平台作为双边平台所特有的正负交叉网络外部性,本文应用动态博弈理论,构建了平台版权决策模型,给出了平台在不同客户多归属情况下的最优独家版权采购决策。分析结果表明,多归属观众的存在会将市场中任一平台依靠独家版权获得的差异化竞争优势,转变为市场中所有平台均可获得的公共利益。因此,投入成本购买独家版权的平台会被其竞争平台“搭便车”。但如果此时市场中的广告主也存在多归属行为,即使公共利益仍然存在,竞争平台也会放弃“搭便车”。此时市场中的平台将自然转为合作,共同提高内容订阅市场的总份额。与此同时,这些平台仍将保持在广告市场中的竞争,最终构成相互之间的竞合关系。这代表了视频平台间竞争的“搭便车”策略,及对这一策略的有效应对方式。

关键词: 双边平台, 正负交叉网络外部性, 多归属客户, 独家版权, “搭便车”行为

Abstract:

To win the competition, all major online video platforms are now increasing the number of their exclusive video for differentiation. However, this action will directly change the original competition logic between the platforms by generating multi-homing viewers. Simply deciding the number of exclusive rights from the perspective of competitive differentiation is unwise. Combining the “positive and negative cross network externalities” of streaming media platforms, the dynamic game theory is applied to give the optimal exclusive content procuring decision of such platforms under different clients' multi-homing scenarios. The optimal exclusive rights ratio decisions of platforms under different market homing scenarios and specifies three sets of environmental factors that platforms should focus on in their decisions are given. In particular, the platform's two-sided pricing and exclusive rights procurement cost directly affect the platform's decision, while the homing of the two-sided market exerts an indirect influence on the exclusive rights ratio by affecting the platform's pricing decision. Subsequently, by comparing the equilibrium results of different scenarios, the complex impact of multi-homing behavior of two-sided clients on platforms' exclusive rights decisions and competitive strategies is further explored. Viewers' multi-homing behavior can cause competitively weak platforms to “free-rider” when making exclusive rights decisions. However, if advertisers also engage in multi-homing behavior, the interaction between multi-homing viewers and advertisers can lead competing platforms to jointly increase exclusivity ratios in some cases in order to increase market size. At this point, a cooperative relationship exists between competing platforms. Finally, the impact of multi-homing behavior of two-sided clients on platform profits is analyzed. This impact is reflected in the fact that the multi-homing behavior of different clients in video platforms changes the scope and direction of the impact of exclusive rights on platform profits. Existing studies related to the competition for exclusive rights in video platforms mainly focus on the impact of viewers' multi-homing behavior on platforms' competition in the content market, and few studies focus on the impact of viewers' multi-homing behavior on platforms' competition in the advertising market. Even fewer studies have focused on the impact of viewers' and advertisers' multi-homing behavior on competition in the two-sided market, and have considered the interaction between the two types of multi-homing clients in video platforms' exclusive rights decisions. The ratio of exclusive rights of platforms in competitive markets is analyzed by integrating the multi-homing behaviors of viewers and advertisers, which is of theoretical value. From a practical point of view, most of the current video platforms are obsessed with pursuing a high percentage of exclusive rights as a means to differentiate themselves from the competition. The irrationality of this approach is proved. Due to the existence of multi-homing viewers and multi-homing advertisers, a high percentage of exclusive rights does not necessarily bring a competitive advantage to platforms, but instead leads to heavy cost burdens.

Key words: two-sided platform, cross network externalities, multi-homing consumer, exclusive content, free-riding

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