主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 382-395.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2026.0370

• • 上一篇    

区块链技术赋能下双渠道低碳供应链内部契约协调与外部激励机制研究

曲国华1(), 贺茹2, 曲卫华3, 王迪1   

  1. 1.山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山西 太原 030006
    2.山西财经大学工商管理学院,山西 太原 030006
    3.山西大学管理科学与决策研究所,山西 太原 030031
  • 收稿日期:2026-02-27 修回日期:2026-06-19 出版日期:2026-11-25 发布日期:2026-11-10
  • 通讯作者: 曲国华 E-mail:xz_qgh@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72274115);国家自然科学基金项目(72301164);智能优化计算与区块链技术山西省重点实验室开放课题(I0CBT2026B01);山西省社会科学界联合会2026—2027年度重点课题(SSKLZDKT2026105)

Research on Internal Contract Coordination and External Incentive Mechanisms in Blockchain Technology-enabled Dual-channel Low-carbon Supply Chains

Guohua Qu1(), Ru He2, Weihua Qu3, Di Wang1   

  1. 1.School of Management Science and Engineering,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China
    2.School of Business Administration,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China
    3.Institute of Management Science and Decision Making,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030031,China
  • Received:2026-02-27 Revised:2026-06-19 Online:2026-11-25 Published:2026-11-10
  • Contact: Guohua Qu E-mail:xz_qgh@163.com

摘要:

随着电子商务与绿色转型深入推进,双渠道低碳供应链面临渠道竞争、减排外部性和低碳信息可信度不足等问题。本文构建制造商主导的Stackelberg模型,在给定减排率和低碳营销努力水平下,考察成本共担契约、政府补贴与区块链技术递进引入对定价、利润分配和社会福利的影响,并扩展分析平台主导的佣金决策及不同权力结构绩效差异。研究发现:成本共担契约主要调整成员利润分配,不改变均衡价格与社会福利;在契约基础上引入政府补贴,可提高批发价格、降低线下零售价格,增加供应链成员利润和社会福利;进一步引入区块链技术,可通过提高低碳信息透明度与可信度扩大市场需求,增强内部契约与外部激励的协同作用,但其净收益受单位增值收益、变动成本和固定成本约束。平台主导时,平台利润最大化佣金率可能高于社会福利最大化佣金率,导致佣金过度。本文揭示了内部成本共担、外部政策激励与区块链技术之间的递进关系,为数字经济条件下双渠道低碳供应链治理提供决策依据。

关键词: 区块链技术, 双渠道低碳供应链, 成本共担契约, 政府补贴

Abstract:

As e-commerce and the green transition continue to advance, dual-channel low-carbon supply chains face challenges arising from channel competition, emission-reduction externalities, and insufficient credibility of low-carbon information. This paper constructs a manufacturer-led Stackelberg model. With the carbon emission reduction rate and low-carbon marketing effort exogenously given, it examines the impacts of the sequential introduction of cost-sharing contracts, government subsidies, and blockchain technology on pricing, profit allocation, and social welfare. Furthermore, it extends the analysis to platform-led commission decisions and the performance differences under various power structures. The main findings are as follows: Cost-sharing contracts mainly adjust the distribution of member profits without changing equilibrium prices and social welfare; introducing government subsidies on the basis of contracts can increase wholesale prices, lower offline retail prices, and increase both the profits of supply chain members and social welfare; further introducing blockchain technology can expand market demand by improving the transparency and credibility of low-carbon information, thereby enhancing the synergy between internal contracts and external incentives. However, its net benefit is constrained by unit value-added revenue, variable costs, and fixed costs. In the platform-led scenario, the platform-selected commission rate may exceed the welfare-maximizing level, resulting in an excessively high commission rate. This paper reveals the sequential relationship among internal cost sharing, external policy incentives, and blockchain technology, providing decision-making references for the governance of dual-channel low-carbon supply chains under the digital economy.

Key words: blockchain technology, dual-channel low-carbon supply chain, cost-sharing contract, government subsidy

中图分类号: