关键词: 区块链技术, 供应链透明度, 双渠道, 权力结构, 产品溯源

Abstract:

In recent years， frequent product safety incidents have significantly undermined consumers’ trust in product quality， shifting their attitudes from assuming safety by default to adopting a more skeptical stance. Against this backdrop， firms have increasingly attached importance to information disclosure， making the improvement of supply chain transparency a key strategic choice. However， information disclosure not only incurs costs， but its optimal level is not necessarily the highest possible. Its effectiveness may be jointly influenced by the interaction among supply chain power structure， channel strategy， and technological means. Yet， these mechanisms have not been systematically studied. To fill this gap， a two-echelon supply chain model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is developed， in which the manufacturer can decide whether to open a direct-sales channel. Under different power structures， the interaction between channel choice and transparency improvement is analyzed， and further blockchain technology is incorporated to enhance the reliability of information disclosure， exploring its impact on the behavior of supply chain members and profit distribution. The results show that the manufacturer’s decision on supply chain transparency is not affected by the power structure， while its wholesale pricing decision increases as its bargaining power rises. In contrast， the retailer’s optimal pricing strategy is highly dependent on its relative power： when weaker， it tends to set lower prices to maintain competitiveness； when stronger， it prefers higher prices to obtain greater profits. Improving supply chain transparency facilitates the manufacturer’s adoption of a direct-sales channel， but this effect exhibits different characteristics under different power structures. As the manufacturer’s power increases （from Retailer-led to equal power to Manufacturer-led）， both its willingness to open a direct-sales channel and the impact of transparency on channel choice first weaken and then strengthen. When direct-sales costs are high， the manufacturer prefers to maintain a single-channel structure， allowing the retailer to earn stable profits， while the manufacturer can profit only if traceability costs are low. Conversely， when direct-sales costs are low， the manufacturer is inclined to open a direct-sales channel and exclusively capture the benefits brought by improved transparency， leaving the retailer unable to profit. Therefore， although the optimal transparency level under a dual-channel structure may be lower when consumers’ online acceptance is low， the manufacturer is always more likely to profit from enhancing supply chain transparency in a dual-channel setting. Further analysis reveals that the retailer’s adoption preference for blockchain technology depends on the manufacturer’s channel choice， whereas the manufacturer’s adoption preference is mainly determined by blockchain’s efficiency in improving the reliability of information disclosure.

Key words: blockchain technology, supply chain transparency, dual-channel, power structure, product traceability