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主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 174-185.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2025.0023cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2025.0023

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平台信息共享与个性化定价:品牌竞争、成本差异与佣金率的影响

许明辉1,2(), 唐娟红1,2, 曹红红1, 孙星星1   

  1. 1.武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北 武汉 430072
    2.武汉大学科技商学院,湖北 武汉 430072
  • 收稿日期:2025-01-04 修回日期:2025-07-05 出版日期:2026-11-25 发布日期:2026-11-10
  • 通讯作者: 许明辉 E-mail:mhxu@whu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72171181);国家自然科学基金项目(72031009)

Online Platform Information Sharing and Personalized Pricing: The Impact of Brand Competition, Cost Differences and Commission Rates

Minghui Xu1,2(), Juanhong Tang1,2, Honghong Cao1, Xingxing Sun1   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China
    2.Business School of Science and Technology,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China
  • Received:2025-01-04 Revised:2025-07-05 Online:2026-11-25 Published:2026-11-10
  • Contact: Minghui Xu E-mail:mhxu@whu.edu.cn

摘要:

对于拥有私有需求信息的电商平台销售自有品牌产品与商家品牌产品进行竞争的情形,在自有品牌与商家品牌产品间存在生产成本和质量差异的背景下,构建垂直差异化模型,探究平台信息共享策略与双方定价策略的交互(个性化定价和统一定价),分析不同定价策略对消费者剩余和社会福利水平的影响。结果表明,信息不共享时,只有当佣金率低或佣金率较低且自有品牌产品竞争优势较为显著时,平台利用信息优势个性化定价才有利可图。存在信息共享合约时,不仅有平台和商家都个性化定价的情形,还可能存在平台向商家共享信息帮助其个性化定价而平台统一定价的情形,甚至还存在平台共享信息让商家个性化定价而自己退出市场的情形。当佣金率处于高位时,信息共享使得商家的个性化定价行为损害消费者剩余和社会福利;当佣金率较高且品牌间成本差异也较高时,信息共享时平台和商家都个性化定价,此时因激烈竞争导致销售价较低,使得消费者剩余和社会福利水平均增加。

关键词: 电商平台, 自有品牌, 信息共享, 个性化定价

Abstract:

In the digital transformation of the retail industry, store brands of e-commerce platforms have emerged to compete with sellers’ national brands. Owing to their substantial information advantage, platforms can implement personalized pricing. However, the third-party sellers lack enough consumer information for personalized pricing. They are either confined by their limited data gathering and analysis capabilities or have restricted access to consumer information. Although some platforms share information with sellers, this practice exerts a dual impact on platform revenue: on one hand, it may indirectly benefit the platform through the increase in seller’ profits; on the other hand, it may lead to a decline in the platform’s profits due to price competition.​Furthermore, the store brand products launched by platforms are often positioned as lower-quality alternatives to national brand products. Relying on the operation model of self-production and self-marketing or direct cooperation with suppliers, these store brands possess significant advantages in terms of cost and price, they have gradually become an unignorable competitive force.​ Motivated by this perspective, in the context of the quality and produce cost differences between the e-commerce platform’s store brand products and the seller’s national brand products, the interaction between the platform’s information sharing strategy and the pricing strategies (personalized pricing and uniform pricing) of both parties is explored by constructing a vertically differentiated model, and the impact of different pricing strategies on consumer surplus and social welfare levels is analyzed.The results show that when the platform does not share the information, the platform may not obtain additional benefits from its information advantage. Only when the commission rate is low, or when the commission rate is relatively low and the competitive advantage of store brand products is relatively significant, can platforms gain profits by using their information advantages to implement personalized pricing. When existing information sharing contract, there are not only cases where both the platform and sellers adopt personalized pricing, but also possible cases where the platform shares information with sellers to support them in implementing personalized pricing while the platform itself uses uniform pricing. There may even be cases where the platform shares information to help sellers to conduct personalized pricing and withdraws from the market itself. If the commission rate is at a high level, information sharing causes sellers’ personalized pricing behavior to harm consumer surplus and social welfare. If the commission rate is relatively high and the cost difference between brands is also relatively high, both the platform and sellers adopt personalized pricing when platform shares information. In this case, the intense competition leads to lower selling prices, which increases both consumer surplus and the level of social welfare.

Key words: online platform, store brand, information sharing, personalized pricing

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