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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 163-173.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2025.0384cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2025.0384

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平台收入分成合同下考虑声誉成本的策略推荐

凌六一(), 岳钊名   

  1. 中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽 合肥 230026
  • 收稿日期:2025-03-10 修回日期:2025-08-12 出版日期:2026-11-25 发布日期:2026-11-10
  • 通讯作者: 凌六一 E-mail:lyling@ustc.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171220);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72371235)

Strategic Recommendations under Platform Revenue Sharing Contracts, Considering Reputational Cost

Liuyi Ling(), Zhaoming Yue   

  1. School of Management,University of Science & Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China
  • Received:2025-03-10 Revised:2025-08-12 Online:2026-11-25 Published:2026-11-10
  • Contact: Liuyi Ling E-mail:lyling@ustc.edu.cn

摘要:

推荐功能正在各在线购物平台推广以促进消费者的购买行为,考虑其不同策略推荐程度对不同先验信念情况下的消费者行为影响不同,商家和平台如何进行信息设计以最大化自身利润?本文构建了一个多阶段的非合作博弈模型,利用斯塔克尔伯格动态博弈理论进行逆推求解,在平台收入分成合同下考虑了声誉成本,并深入探究了商家是否使用推荐功能以及使用策略推荐影响消费者信念的最优程度和平台对于推荐功能收取的最优门槛费。研究发现:推荐功能可扩大消费者市场并通过改变消费者信念进而促进其购买行为;即使平台免收推荐功能门槛费,高品牌影响力商家未必有使用动机;在推荐功能中使用一定程度的策略推荐可以提高销量,这种动机与推荐功能的准确度和消费者信念有关;平台不具备完美信息时,商家可以减少被平台榨取的利润,商家可以通过提前谈判避免与平台的“双输”。此外,本文对于结论进行了定量分析,并给出了相应的管理启示。

关键词: 信息设计, 在线购物平台, 策略推荐算法, 贝叶斯劝说

Abstract:

Recommendation is being widely adopted by online shopping platforms to enhance consumer purchasing behavior. Given that different recommendation strategies exert varying effects on consumer behavior under different prior beliefs, how the firm and platform should design their information strategies to maximize profits is explored. A multi-stage non-cooperative game model is constructed using Stackelberg dynamic game theory for backward induction, incorporating reputation costs under the platform’s revenue-sharing contract. The analysis examines whether the firm should adopt the recommendation feature, the optimal intensity of strategic recommendations to influence consumer beliefs, and the platform’s optimal access fee for the feature. The results show that the recommendation feature expands the consumer base and stimulates purchases by reshaping consumer beliefs, yet even when the platform waives access fees, high-brand-equity firms may lack adoption incentives. A moderate level of strategic recommendations can boost sales, with this effect contingent on the feature’s accuracy and consumer beliefs. Under asymmetric information, the firm can mitigate profit extraction by the platform, and prior negotiation may avert a “lose-lose” outcome. The quantitative analysis and managerial insights are provided to support these findings.

Key words: information design, online shopping platform, strategic recommendation algorithm, Bayesian persuasion

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