重大突发公共卫生事件下的政企联合打假策略分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0918

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

重大突发公共卫生事件导致部分商品价格暴涨，少数企业会因利益驱使而实施造假行为。为有效解决这一现实难题，本文首先将造假商品分为欺骗性伪劣商品和非欺骗性伪劣商品，然后引入政府、合规企业、造假企业等博弈主体，并通过考虑商品外表等级、质量等级等因素建立博弈模型。在确定合格商品、欺骗性伪劣商品和非欺骗性伪劣商品的市场需求以及最优定价后，对博弈主体收益、政企打假联盟目的、联盟成立条件进行系统分析。研究发现：只有当政府对造假企业的罚款以及检查力度超过一定值后，才能有效遏制企业的造假行为；面对不同类型的伪劣商品时，合规企业应该调整合格商品的定价策略；政府和合规企业应该在商品检查的必经之路处形成打假联盟。

关键词: 欺骗性伪劣商品, 非欺骗性伪劣商品, 打假联盟, 博弈模型

Abstract:

During major public health emergencies， some enterprises exploit the surge in demand by engaging in counterfeiting to maximize profits. Effectively addressing this issue of combating counterfeiting， protecting consumer rights， and maintaining market order has become a critical concern. In response， products are categorized into three types based on appearance and quality： qualified products， deceptive counterfeit products， and non-deceptive counterfeit products. A game-theoretic model is then developed， with the government， compliant enterprises， and counterfeiters as key players. The model analyzes market demand， pricing strategies for each product type， and determines the optimal pricing for these products.

Using the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic as a case study， the analysis reveals that when deceptive counterfeit products dominate the market， compliant enterprises can reduce demand for these counterfeits by raising the prices of qualified products. Conversely， when non-deceptive counterfeit products prevail， compliant enterprises must lower the prices of qualified products to curb demand for these lower-quality products. Furthermore， government penalties and inspection efforts play a crucial role in deterring counterfeiting. It is found that only when fines and inspection intensity surpass a certain threshold can counterfeiting activities be effectively suppressed. Additionally， the formation of an anti-counterfeiting alliance between the government and compliant enterprises significantly enhances the efficiency of combating counterfeit products， especially at key stages of the product inspection process.

The results demonstrate that joint anti-counterfeiting efforts by the government and compliant enterprises represent an effective strategy， particularly during major public health emergencies. A systematic analysis shows that imposing sufficiently high penalties and conducting thorough inspections can effectively deter the production of both deceptive and non-deceptive counterfeit products. Moreover， compliant enterprises can further reduce demand for counterfeit products by strategically adjusting the prices of qualified products， thereby contributing to the overall reduction of counterfeits in the market.

In summary， it enriches the existing literature by illustrating that a game-theoretic model of government-enterprise collaboration in anti-counterfeiting not only explains the strategic decisions of key stakeholders but also provides valuable theoretical support and practical guidance for policy-making， especially in the context of major public health emergencies.

Key words: deceptive counterfeit products, non-deceptive counterfeit products, anti-counterfeiting alliance, game model

中图分类号:

C935

汪越,刘明,曹杰. 重大突发公共卫生事件下的政企联合打假策略分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(1): 282-292.

Yue Wang,Ming Liu,Jie Cao. Analysis of the Joint Anti-Counterfeiting Strategy between Government and Enterprises under Major Public Health Emergencies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(1): 282-292.

图/表 5

表1

参数设置"

参数	值	参数	值
$δ$	0.5	$α$	0.8
$β$	0.7	$k G$	2
$k E$	1	$f d$	0.8
$q c$	0.2	$f n$	0.2
$l 1$	20	$l 2$	10
$γ$	0.8	$φ$	0.4

表1

图1

图2

图3

表2

关键参数对相关指标的敏感性分析"

指标参数	$D o d$	$D d$	$D o n$	$D n$	$p o d$	$p o n$	$p n$	$∏ G$	$∏ O$	$∏ C$
$k G$	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	—	O	O
$k E$	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	—	O
$f d$	—	+	O	O	+	O	O	—	—	+
$f n$	O	O	—	+	O	—	+	—	—	+
$q c$	—	+	—	+	+	—	+	—	—	+
$l 1$	O	O	+	—	O	+	+	+	$N 1$	—
$l 2$	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	—	O	O
$γ$	—	+	O	O	—	O	O	$N 2$	$N 3$	$N 4$

表2

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