关键词: 资金约束, 双渠道供应链, 风险规避, 促销努力, 收益共享契约

Abstract:

With the development of e-commerce， more and more suppliers have introduced online direct sales model based on the traditional retail model， which leads to both double marginal effects and peer channel conflicts for upstream and downstream enterprises. For this reason， retailers use various promotional effort activities to expand market demand in order to gain more market share in the competition， and these effort activities require a large amount of financial support， making the enterprises more prone to capital shortage. However， from the consideration of improving the overall performance of the supply chain， reducing the double marginal benefits， incentivizing retailers' promotional efforts， and designing proven coordination contracts by upstream enterprises to enhance the revenue of the supply chain system and increase the overall competitiveness of the supply chain have become the main means of operating enterprises in the supply chain. At the same time， as market competition becomes more and more intense， the uncertainty of market demand for products increases， and the risk borne by retailers increases， so the risk attitude of retailers may have an impact on the operation and coordination strategies of upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain. Therefore， it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to study the coordination mechanism of the dual channel of financial constraints by considering the influence of retailers' risk attitude， financing and promotion efforts under stochastic demand.In order to effectively solve the coordination problem in dual-channel supply chain financing under the above conditions. In this paper， a bank lending financing model based on CVaR criterion for dual-channel supply chains is developed， and the optimal decision making and coordination of dual-channel supply chains under wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract are analyzed， along with the effects of model parameter changes on the optimal decision variables and revenue of each firm. Finally， the main conclusions of the paper， the effectiveness of revenue sharing contract coordination， and the conditions for Pareto improvement are numerically verified.It is shown that under the condition that market demand and effort level satisfy the multiplicative relationship， the retailer's sales effort has a positive impact on the sales volume of both the retailer and the supplier， while the retailer's risk aversion characteristics only affect its own sales volume and have no impact on the direct sales volume of the supplier. Moreover， the risk-aversion and revenue-sharing ratios of retailers can be coordinated and achieve Pareto improvement in the dual-channel supply chain when a certain range is satisfied. Finally， the numerical analysis verifies that the revenue sharing coefficient decreases with the increase of risk aversion when the supply chain is coordinated； the expected value of the random variable of market demand is negatively related to the supplier's direct sales and the retailer's order quantity as well as their profits， but does not affect the supplier's wholesale price and the coordination of the revenue sharing contract. Therefore， in the supply chain financing and operation decision， it is more beneficial to the enterprise and the supply chain decision to fully consider the risk-averse characteristics of the enterprise， the volatility of the market demand and the impact of the coordination strategy to be more realistic and improve the market competitiveness of the supply chain.

Key words: financial constraints, dual-channel supply chain, risk aversion, promotional efforts, revenue sharing contracts