EPR制度下新能源汽车闭环供应链的回收成本分担机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1759

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为促进报废新能源汽车的有效回收，从而推动汽车零部件再制造以及动力电池梯次利用，本文基于EPR（extended producer respensibility）制度探讨了新能源汽车闭环供应链最优的回收成本分担机制。建立了由电池供应商、汽车制造商和回收商构成的闭环供应链决策模型，分别研究了无回收成本分担情形、电池供应商分担回收成本情形以及汽车制造商分担回收成本情形，进而探讨了闭环供应链的经济效益、环境效益和社会效益。研究发现：随着分担比例的提高，电池供应商分担回收成本情形下，汽车的售价、废旧汽车的回收率、消费者剩余、汽车制造商和闭环供应链的利润、环境效益和社会福利均不变，此时回收成本分担机制仅改变了电池供应商和回收商之间的利润分配；在电池供应商分担回收成本情形下，回收商的利润反而随着电池供应商分担比例的提高而降低；综合闭环供应链成员的利润、消费者、环境和社会福利来看，与电池供应商相比，汽车制造商应该分担回收成本。

关键词: 新能源汽车, 回收成本分担, 闭环供应链, EPR制度

Abstract:

With the advance of manufacturing and new energy technology， new energy vehicles are trusted by consumers for their energy-saving and environmental protection characteristics. Due to policy and technological support， the global sales of new energy vehicles are gradually increasing.Although new energy vehicles have many advantages for consumers and the environment， the rapidly increasing number of new energy vehicles and their core component， power batteries， have also brought many challenges. At present， the lifespan of the first batch of new energy vehicles is approaching its end. A large number of scrapped new energy vehicles and retired power batteries not only cause waste of resources， but also pose certain environmental hazards. However， the large-scale waste disposal also contains huge business opportunities. On the one hand， although new energy vehicles have reached the end of their lifespan， some components still have high reuse value， such as motors， high-voltage wiring harnesses， and transmissions. On the other hand， retired power batteries still have a capacity of 70% to 80%， and cascading utilization can still play an important value.To promote the effective recycling of end-of-life new energy vehicles， thereby promoting the remanufacturing of key components and the echelon utilization of power batteries， the optimal cost-sharing mechanism for a closed-loop supply chain （CLSC） of new energy vehicles is explored based on extended producer responsibility （EPR）. The decision-making CLSC model， composed of a battery supplier， an automobile manufacturer and a collector， is established， and then the scenarios of no cost sharing， the supplier sharing cost and the manufacturer sharing cost are investigated. Subsequently， the economic， environmental and social benefits of the CLSC are studied. The results show that， with the increase of cost-sharing proportion， the selling price of unit vehicle， the recovery rate of end-of-life vehicles， consumer surplus， the profits of the manufacturer and the CLSC， the environmental benefits and the social welfare remain unchanged if the supplier shares collection cost， under which， the cost-sharing mechanism only changes the profit distribution between the supplier and the collector； under the scenario of the battery supplier sharing collection cost， the collector’s profit decreases with the cost-sharing proportion； from the perspectives of the CLSC’s profits， consumers， the environment and social welfare， the manufacturer is ought to share collect cost rather than the supplier.

Key words: new energy vehicles, cost-sharing contract, closed-loop supply chain, EPR

中图分类号:

F252

丁军飞, 浦徐进, 曹雨馨, 李静. EPR制度下新能源汽车闭环供应链的回收成本分担机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(12): 257-268.

Junfei Ding, Xujin Pu, Yuxin Cao, Jing Li. Cost-sharing Mechanism for Closed-loop Supply Chain of New Energy Vehicles under EPR[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(12): 257-268.

图/表 8

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符号	说明
$w$	电池的单位采购价
$p$	汽车的单位售价
$b$	废旧品的单位回购价
$τ$	废旧品的回收率
$a$	市场规模，即潜在市场需求
$ϕ$	价格弹性系数
$q$	最终产品的产量，也是电池的采购量
$Δ$	再制造成本优势
$c$	单位废旧品的回收成本
$c 0$	电池的生产成本
$r$	梯次利用的单位收益
$k$	回收难度系数
$φ$	回收成本分担比例
$γ$	环境效率
$ε$	单位环境影响的经济价值
$E$	环境影响
$C S$	消费者剩余
$W$	社会福利
$π$	利润

参数	情形N	情形S	情形M
$w$	$2 k (a - c 0) 8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2 + c 0$	$[4 k + φ (Δ + r - c) 2] (a - c 0) 2 [8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] + c 0$	$k (2 - φ) (a - c 0) 4 k (2 - φ) - (Δ + r - c) 2 + c 0$
$p$	$a - 2 k (a - c 0) 8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2$	$a - 2 k (a - c 0) 8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2$	$a - k (2 - φ) (a - c 0) 4 k (2 - φ) - (Δ + r - c) 2$
$b$	$Δ + c - r 2$	$Δ + c - r - φ (Δ + r - c) 2$	$(1 - φ) Δ + c - r 2 - φ$
$τ$	$(a - c 0) (Δ + r - c) 8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2$	$(a - c 0) (Δ + r - c) 8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2$	$(a - c 0) (Δ + r - c) 4 k (2 - φ) - (Δ + r - c) 2$
$π s$	$4 k 2 (a - c 0) 2 [8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$	$k (a - c 0) 2 [8 k + φ (Δ + r - c) 2] 2 [8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$	$k 2 (2 - φ) 2 (a - c 0) 2 [4 k (2 - φ) - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$
$π m$	$k (a - c 0) 2 8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2$	$k (a - c 0) 2 8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2$	$k (2 - φ) (a - c 0) 2 2 [4 k (2 - φ) - (Δ + r - c) 2]$
$π c$	$k (a - c 0) 2 (Δ + r - c) 2 2 [8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$	$k (1 - φ) (a - c 0) 2 (Δ + r - c) 2 2 [8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$	$k (1 - φ) (a - c 0) 2 (Δ + r - c) 2 2 [4 k (2 - φ) - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$
$π t$	$k (a - c 0) 2 [24 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2 [8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$	$k (a - c 0) 2 [24 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2 [8 k - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$	$k (a - c 0) 2 [6 k (2 - φ) 2 - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2 [4 k (2 - φ) - (Δ + r - c) 2] 2$

$k$	$φ 0$	$φ 1$	$φ 2$	$k 0$	$k 1$	$k 2$
12	0.62	0.75	0.75	8.25	15.00	12.75
14	0.82	0.86	0.64	8.25	15.00	12.75
16	0.97	0.94	0.56	8.25	15.00	12.75

$k$	$φ$	$w S *$	$w M *$	$p S *$	$p M *$	$b S *$	$b M *$	$τ S *$	$τ M *$
12	0	5.00	5.00	6.00	6.00	3.00	3.00	0.50	0.50
	0.2	5.30	5.14	6.00	5.86	2.40	2.67	0.50	0.59
	0.4	5.60	5.35	6.00	5.65	1.80	2.25	0.50	0.73
	0.6	5.90	5.69	6.00	5.31	1.20	1.71	0.50	0.96
14	0	4.84	4.84	6.16	6.16	3.00	3.00	0.39	0.39
	0.2	5.08	4.94	6.16	6.06	2.40	2.67	0.39	0.46
	0.4	5.32	5.09	6.16	5.91	1.80	2.25	0.39	0.56
	0.6	5.55	5.31	6.16	5.69	1.20	1.71	0.39	0.71
16	0	4.74	4.74	6.26	6.26	3.00	3.00	0.33	0.33
	0.2	4.93	4.82	6.26	6.18	2.40	2.67	0.33	0.38
	0.4	5.13	4.93	6.26	6.07	1.80	2.25	0.33	0.45
	0.6	5.33	5.09	6.26	5.91	1.20	1.71	0.33	0.56
	0.95	5.67	5.69	6.26	5.28	0.12	0.23	0.33	0.98

$k$	$φ$	$π s S *$	$π s M *$	$π m S *$	$π m M *$	$π c S *$	$π c M *$	$π t S *$	$π t M *$
12	0	4.00	4.00	5.00	5.00	1.50	1.50	10.50	10.50
	0.2	4.30	4.59	5.00	5.36	1.20	1.70	10.50	11.65
	0.4	4.60	5.54	5.00	5.88	0.90	1.95	10.50	13.36
	0.6	4.90	7.25	5.00	6.73	0.60	2.22	10.50	16.20
14	0	3.39	3.39	4.60	4.60	1.09	1.09	9.09	9.09
	0.2	3.61	3.78	4.60	4.86	0.87	1.20	9.09	9.84
	0.4	3.83	4.37	4.60	5.22	0.65	1.32	9.09	10.91
	0.6	4.05	5.34	4.60	5.78	0.44	1.40	9.09	12.52
	0.8	4.27	7.25	4.60	6.73	0.22	1.29	9.09	15.27
16	0	3.02	3.02	4.35	4.35	0.85	0.85	8.22	8.22
	0.2	3.19	3.31	4.35	4.54	0.68	0.92	8.22	8.77
	0.4	3.36	3.72	4.35	4.82	0.51	0.98	8.22	9.51
	0.6	3.53	4.37	4.35	5.22	0.34	1.00	8.22	10.59
	0.9	3.79	6.54	4.35	6.39	0.08	0.61	8.22	13.55