数智驱动营销下企业网络平台供应链的绿色产品营销策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1214

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

网络平台具有的数智驱动营销技术和在线销售服务功能有助于绿色产品的生产和销售。因此，本文构建了由一个制造商和一个平台所组成的网络平台供应链模型，考虑了制造商投资绿色技术生产产品，网络平台利用消费者在线购物数据开展数智驱动营销活动，研究了制造商和平台合作营销绿色产品的营销策略，以及考虑制造商利用成本共担契约协同网络平台开展数智驱动营销绿色产品的问题。研究发现：1）优化绿色投资和数智驱动营销成本，以及提升消费者对绿色产品和数智驱动营销的敏感度，均有利于提升网络平台供应链成员的获利水平和产品的绿色水平；2）在代售策略下，网络平台收取的佣金率是影响制造商和平台销售策略选择的主要因素，存在一个佣金率阈值，使得制造商和平台均可获取相较转售策略更多的利润；3）在代售和转售策略下，制造商可利用成本共担契约有效激励网络平台销售绿色产品，且存在一个成本共担的阈值，使得制造商和网络平台均有机会获得帕累托改进的利润，网络平台收取较少的佣金、制造商分担较大的营销成本均有利于实现经济和生态效益的共赢。

关键词: 数智驱动营销, 绿色生产, 网络平台供应链, 在线销售, 成本共担契约

Abstract:

The rapid development of the global economy has led to the continuous deterioration of the climate and ecological environment， and people are gradually recognizing the importance of green production and development. With the swift advancement of technology， the functionalities of online sales services and data-driven marketing advantages on Internet platforms are becoming increasingly prominent， all of which contribute to the production and sale of green products. A pressing issue arises regarding how manufacturing enterprises engaged in green research and development activities cooperate with platforms to sell products， achieving a win-win in economic， ecological， and social benefits. Therefore， manufacturers investing in green technology are contemplated to produce products and internet platforms utilizing consumer online shopping data to conduct data-driven marketing activities， and a network platform supply chain model composed of a manufacturer and a platform is constructed. The Stackelberg game model was used to study the economic and ecological benefits of cooperative marketing of green products between manufacturers and platforms in different sales models. Furthermore， the issue of manufacturers utilizing cost-sharing contracts to collaborate with network platforms in conducting data-driven marketing of green products is considered， and the accuracy of the results is validated through numerical analysis. It is found that： 1） optimizing green investment and data-driven marketing costs， as well as enhancing consumer sensitivity to green products and data-driven marketing， are conducive to elevating the profit levels of network platform supply chain members and the greenness of products； 2） under the agency selling strategy， the commission rate charged by the network platform is a primary factor affecting the selection of sales strategies by manufacturers and platforms， with a commission rate threshold existing that enables both manufacturers and platforms to obtain more profits compared to a reselling strategy； 3） under the agency selling strategy and reselling strategy， manufacturers can effectively motivate network platforms to sell green products using cost-sharing contract， and there exists a cost-sharing threshold， enabling both manufacturers and network platforms to potentially achieve Pareto-improved profits. Lower commissions charged by the network platform and larger marketing costs shared by manufacturers are conducive to realizing a win-win in economic and ecological benefits. A theoretical foundation is provided for better realizing the comprehensive development of economic and environmental benefits in the supply chain.

Key words: data-driven marketing, green production, platform supply chain, online sales, cost-sharing contract

中图分类号:

X322

陈翼,孙晓曼,张宁,蔡双立,牟宗玉. 数智驱动营销下企业网络平台供应链的绿色产品营销策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(5): 81-92.

Yi Chen,Xiaoman Sun,Ning Zhang,Shuangli Cai,Zongyu Mu. Research on Green Product Marketing Strategy of Enterprise Network Platform Supply Chain under Data-driven Marketing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(5): 81-92.

图/表 8

图1

图2

图3

图4

图5

图6

表1

数据集1的均衡结果"

参数	$θ$	$η$	$p$	$e$	$t$	$q$	制造商利润	平台利润
$r$	—	—	0.962264	0.377358	0.377358	0.377358	0.18867924	0.11036
$a$	—	0.15	0.665499	0.595447	0.070053	0.633975	0.29772329	0.043307
	—	0.3	0.698529	0.514706	0.183824	0.615809	0.25735294	0.105597
	—	0.45	0.73501	0.425532	0.309478	0.595745	0.21276595	0.16282
	—	0.6	0.77551	0.326531	0.44898	0.573469	0.16326530	0.21212
	—	0.75	0.820734	0.215983	0.604752	0.548596	0.10799136	0.249476
$r c$	0.1	—	0.962264	0.377358	0.377358	0.792453	0.188679245	0.11036
	0.3	—	1.011169	0.390905	0.502593	0.882329	0.195452732	0.108602
	0.5	—	1.100853	0.387898	0.698216	0.98526	0.193948798	0.089526
	0.6	—	1.165733	0.358343	0.806271	0.99888	0.179171333	0.063402
$a c$	0.1	0.2	0.669885	0.599371	0.078349	0.635089	0.299685451	0.04354
		0.45	0.748821	0.433528	0.350325	0.603913	0.216763869	0.165557
		0.75	0.794056	0.208962	0.650104	0.592524	0.104481077	0.261098
	0.3	0.2	0.682388	0.610558	0.102615	0.63854	0.305278838	0.044208
		0.45	0.779735	0.451426	0.469014	0.634463	0.225712752	0.173654
		0.75	0.665499	0.175131	0.700525	0.728546	0.087565674	0.279965
	0.6	0.2	0.723891	0.647692	0.190498	0.653294	0.323845809	0.046514
		0.45	0.764029	0.442332	0.804241	0.796929	0.221166149	0.198157
		0.75	0.269886	0.071023	0.497159	0.985795	0.035511364	0.173794

表1

表2

数据集2的均衡结果"

参数	$θ$	$η$	$p$	$e$	$t$	$q$	制造商利润	平台利润
$r$	—	—	1.285714	0.571429	0.571429	0.571429	0.2857142	0.204082
$a$	—	0.15	0.853933	0.768278	0.089888	0.786517	0.3841387	0.067668
	—	0.3	0.95	0.712925	0.25	0.7625	0.3564625	0.167188
	—	0.45	1.070423	0.645551	0.450704	0.732394	0.3227752	0.253918
	—	0.6	1.225806	0.56176	0.709677	0.693548	0.2808798	0.30333
	—	0.75	1.433962	0.454721	1.056604	0.641509	0.2273603	0.259167
$r c$	0.1	—	1.285714	0.571429	0.571429	0.857143	0.2897341	0.306748
	0.3	—	1.447284	0.626198	0.805112	0.984026	0.3130990	0.203064
	0.5	—	1.674847	0.613497	1.104294	1.042945	0.3067484	0.122323
	0.6	—	1.724409	0.503937	0.923077	0.913386	0.2519685	0.03968
$a c$	0.1	0.15	0.866059	0.774895	0.101293	0.791082	0.3874475	0.068655
		0.45	1.120588	0.648761	0.524252	0.759172	0.3243806	0.265439
		0.75	1.306174	0.34373	1.069383	0.75366	0.1718650	0.339398
	0.3	0.15	0.901656	0.806745	0.135587	0.805093	0.4033725	0.071587
		0.45	1.243557	0.719954	0.748004	0.857412	0.3599769	0.302072
		0.75	0.853933	0.224719	0.898876	0.988764	0.1123595	0.410049
	0.6	0.15	1.031949	0.923323	0.271565	0.864217	0.4616613	0.082814
		0.45	1.179126	0.682652	1.241185	1.263752	0.3413258	0.396339
		0.75	0.206522	0.054348	0.380435	1.119565	0.0271739	0.148659

表2

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