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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2): 31-42.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1914

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完全供应中断的复杂装备军民协同创新的供应商风险策略研究

黄鑫1,2,陈洪转2(),何益欣3,丁静3   

  1. 1.安徽大学管理学院, 安徽 合肥 230601
    2.南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 江苏 南京 211106
    3.上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院 上海 200433
  • 收稿日期:2020-10-11 修回日期:2021-02-22 出版日期:2024-02-25 发布日期:2024-03-06
  • 通讯作者: 陈洪转 E-mail:chz-hhu@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目(19BJY094)

Study on Supplier's Risk Strategy of Military-civilian Collaborative Innovation about Complex Equipment under Total Supply Disruption

Xin Huang1,2,Hongzhuan Chen2(),Yixin He3,Jing Ding3   

  1. 1.School of Management, Anhui University, Hefei 230601, China
    2.College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China
    3.School of Public Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
  • Received:2020-10-11 Revised:2021-02-22 Online:2024-02-25 Published:2024-03-06
  • Contact: Hongzhuan Chen E-mail:chz-hhu@163.com

摘要:

目前,国内供应商参与装备研制和创新活动越来越常见。复杂装备作为高端装备的代表,在国家军民融合战略背景下实施协同研制更能推动装备升级换代及其高质量发展。供应中断时有发生,复杂装备主制造商—供应商如何应对供应完全中断,如何利用潜在军(民)供应商和主制造商进行协同创新成为研究难点。本研究以复杂装备作为研究对象,探讨了协同研制的创新问题,以进入复杂装备协同研制的军(民)供应商作为切入点,探究类型不同供应商(军民)风险态度对协同创新策略的整体影响,同时探讨主制造商激励策略有无的影响问题。首先,通过构建协同创新的主制造商以及军(民)供应商的生产数量与收益函数。其次,分别以主制造商是否共担供应商零部件的协同创新作为探究出发点,在考虑到协同创新存在损失成本条件下,分析有无主制造商激励下的复杂装备协同创新中共担协同创新成本,构建相对应的Stackelberg博弈模型,并依据Stackelberg模型进行均衡求解并进行计算。最后,借助计算结果和数值验证分析得到实施协同创新的外在条件,以及军(民)供应商应当采取的风险策略。结果研究表明:供应中断发生概率较小状态下,主制造商与军(民)供应商协同参与复杂装备研制过程,军(民)供应商会自动选择承担协同创新的损失成本,有利于实施协同创新,使供应链利润最大化;同时,军(民)供应商采用风险规避策略越谨慎,越有利于最优工艺创新程度和装配创新程度的最佳值获得,对于主制造商施行工艺创新成本分担战略越有利。本文通过分析供应中断可能发生条件下,探究供应商风险态度对复杂装备协同创新活动激励策略的影响,为复杂装备军民协同创新条件,以及参与研制的军(民)供应商应采取的风险策略选择提供了一定参考。

关键词: 军民供应商, 主制造商, 复杂装备, 协同创新, 风险策略

Abstract:

Under the condition of trade friction, it is more and more common for domestic suppliers to participate in equipment development and innovation activities. As the representative of high-end equipment, the implementation of collaborative development of complex equipment in the context of national “civil military integration” can promote the upgrading and high-quality development of equipment. Supply disruption occurs frequently, how to deal with the situation of complete disruption and how to make use of the potential civil (military) suppliers and the main manufacturers to carry out collaborative innovation becomes a research difficulty. Based on the cooperation of complex equipment, the innovation of cooperative development is discussed. Taking the military (civil) suppliers who enters the cooperative development of complex equipment as the starting point, and explores the impact of different types of suppliers' risk attitude (military, civil) on the overall collaborative innovation strategy, then discusses whether the incentive strategy of main manufacturers has any impact. Firstly, the production quantity and revenue function of the main manufacturers, military (civil) suppliers of collaborative innovation are constructed. Secondly, taking whether the main manufacturers share the cost of supplier collaborative innovation as the research point, considering the loss cost of collaborative innovation, whether the main manufacturers have incentive to share the cost of collaborative innovation of complex equipment is analyzed, the corresponding Stackelberg game model is constructed, and the equilibrium according to the Stackelberg model is calculated. Finally, with the help of the calculation results and numerical verification analysis, the external conditions for the implementation of collaborative innovation and the risk strategies for military (civil) supplier is obtained. The results show that: when the external interruption is small, the main manufacturer and military (civil) suppliers could participate in the complex equipment development process cooperatively, and military (civil) supplier automatically choose to bear the loss cost of collaborative innovation, which is conducive to the implementation of collaborative innovation and the maximization of profits in the supply chain. At the same time, the more cautious risk strategy the military (civil) supplier adopts, the more conducive to the optimal process innovation degree and the optimal value of assembly innovation degree. It is also beneficial for the main manufacturer to implement the process innovation cost sharing strategy, the more favorable. The influence of suppliers' risk attitude on the incentive strategy of complex equipment collaborative innovation activities is analyzed, which is under the possible conditions of external interruption, and provides some reference for the conditions of complex equipment civil military collaborative development, and the risk strategy selection of civil military suppliers participate are discussed.

Key words: military(civilian)supplier, main manufacturer, complex equipment, collaborative innovation, risk strategy

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