关键词: 战略性新兴产业, 协同创新, 演化博弈, 供应链

Abstract: Under the new mode of deep cross-integration of emerging technologies, collaborative innovation of supply chain enterprises is an important way to accelerate the extension of industrial chain to the high-end. To realize the technology chain driven by supply chain and the industrial chain, the collaborative innovation evolution of enterprises in supply chain between strategic emerging industries in China is studied in this paper. Collaborative innovation strategy among supply chain members is a dynamic game process in which dynamic adjustment is made on the basis of strategy selection of the other parties. When the two parties of the game make strategy selection, they are affected by the joint effect of various factors. Especially for enterprises in strategic emerging industries, these factors are targeted. Hence, social effects and market risk-return factors are considered based on the strategic and emerging nature of strategic emerging industries to construct an evolutionary game model of supply chain enterprises from different strategic emerging industries. Evolutionary game theory is used in this paper to study the influence of various factors, including database marketing maturity, and the selection of stability strategies for upstream and downstream enterprises is analyzed under market mechanism and government regulation respectively. Case simulation is used to verify and analyse the effect of government regulation when the market mechanism fails. The determination of case data is based on the reference to the previous research and combined with the actual situation of relevant industry experts and scholars to repeatedly discuss, and strive to generalize the simulation data. The specific value does not represent the actual amount, but represents the relative size of each parameter. The results show that factors such as maturity of database marketing, information flow and technology quantity generated by collaborative innovation, coefficient of technology benefits, coefficient of social benefits and barrier factor of profit and loss have positive effects on the evolution of the system towards collaborative innovation direction. When the market mechanism fails, the incentive effect of the government adopting the cost subsidy is more efficient and rapid. The driving force of the achievements reward is more durable. The combination of the two incentives is the best. Moderate supervision and penalties of below the free-rider income level do not guarantee fair competition among enterprises. The punishment above the threshold can effectively restrain the negative impact of free-rider earnings and prospective gains and losses, while driving the system to collaborative innovation. Moreover, the higher the penalty, the faster the system converges. In this paper, the characteristics of strategic emerging industries are taken into account when the game model is constructed, which is of certain reference significance for the future research. At the same time, corresponding countermeasures and suggestions respectively are put forward in the conclusion of this study. The implication has certain guiding value for the enterprise and the government to make decisions.

Key words: strategic emerging industries, collaborative innovation, evolutionary game, supply chain