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中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (11): 174-183.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1683

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考虑交叉网络效应的第三方平台双边用户引入与增值服务策略

眭蓉华1,张旭梅1(),但斌1,李梦丽2,刘墨林3   

  1. 1.重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044
    2.重庆邮电大学经济管理学院, 重庆 400065
    3.重庆工商大学工商管理学院, 重庆 400067
  • 收稿日期:2021-08-25 修回日期:2021-12-15 出版日期:2023-11-15 发布日期:2023-11-20
  • 通讯作者: 张旭梅 E-mail:zhangxumei@cqu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072016)

Bilateral user Introduction and Value-added Service Strategies for the Third-party Platform with Cross-network Effects

Rong-hua SUI1,Xu-mei ZHANG1(),Bin DAN1,Meng-li LI2,Mo-lin LIU3   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
    2.School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, China
    3.School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
  • Received:2021-08-25 Revised:2021-12-15 Online:2023-11-15 Published:2023-11-20
  • Contact: Xu-mei ZHANG E-mail:zhangxumei@cqu.edu.cn

摘要:

针对一个为制造商和供应商提供零部件交易场所的第三方平台,考虑交叉网络效应和增值服务投入影响用户接入平台的效用,构建不同用户引入顺序下平台提供增值服务的博弈模型,研究了第三方平台的最优用户引入策略,提出了不同用户引入决策下平台的双边增值服务与定价策略,并分析了平台增值服务投入对定价的影响以及增值服务的价值。研究结果表明:当制造商的交叉网络效应强度较低时,若为供应商提供服务的边际成本较高且为制造商提供服务的边际成本较低,平台应该先引入供应商,否则,平台应该先引入制造商;无论平台采取何种用户引入策略,在一定条件下,平台可以实施对一边用户“高服务低收费”,而对另一边用户“低服务高收费”的策略;与不提供增值服务的情形相比,平台提供增值服务后降低对一边用户收费更有利。

关键词: 第三方平台, 交叉网络效应, 双边用户引入, 增值服务

Abstract:

With the development of the new generation of information technology, the third-party manufacturing platforms are booming. Such platforms are typical two-sided markets, and cross-network effects (CNEs) exist between their bilateral users. That is, one side users’ market scale will affect the willingness of the other side users to access platforms. Specifically, only if there are a certain number of manufacturers on platforms, suppliers will be willing to access, and vice versa. Therefore, the third-party platforms usually need to ensure the participation of one side users first, and then attract the other side users. In practice, the third-party manufacturing platforms can attract manufacturers or suppliers to access first. Affected by the CNEs of manufacturers and suppliers, different introduction strategies of the third-party platforms will bring a differentiated access volume of users, which affects the development and profitability of the platforms. Consequently, the third-party platforms need to strategically introduce their bilateral users. Meanwhile, to expand the scale of users, many platforms pay attention to value-added service (VAS) investment. Due to the existence of CNEs, providing VAS for the users on one side will affect the access volume of bilateral users simultaneously, which complicates the platform’s user introduction and related VAS and pricing decisions.The main work of our paper includes the following four parts. First, considering CNEs affecting the utility of users accessing the platform, the platform’s user introduction strategies are analyzed by developing a game model under different user access sequences. Second, under optimal user introduction decisions, the bilateral VAS and pricing strategies of the platform are studied, and the impacts of VAS investment on pricing strategies and the value of VAS are explored. Finally, through numerical examples, the main conclusions are verified, and some new insights are obtained.The main results of our paper are as follows.It is found when the manufacturers’ CNE strength is strong, the platform should always introduce manufacturers first. However, when the manufacturers’ CNE strength is weak, the platform can introduce manufacturers or suppliers first. In particular, the platform will benefit more from introducing suppliers first if its marginal investing cost to suppliers is high and that to manufacturers is low. No matter what user introduction strategy is formulated, under certain conditions, the platform should offer a high level of VAS to the users who access first but charge them a low fee, while a low level of VAS to the users who access later but charge them a high fee. Moreover, VAS investment of the platform brings a different impact on its pricing for bilateral users. For the users who access later, the platform should charge them more after providing VAS. However, for the users who access first, the platform may charge them less when it offers VAS.

Key words: the third-party platform, cross-network effects, user introduction, value-added service

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