商超具有价格控制力的生鲜品供应链优化决策

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0137

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

针对大型商超和果蔬农业合作社组成的生鲜品二级供应链，将价格视为控制力的函数，需求同时受价格、保鲜努力和随机因素的共同影响，构建商超主导的分散决策模式与一体化决策模式博弈模型。分析表明，最优控制力水平是客观存在的，并且与控制力价格系数呈反向变动关系，商超可以通过自身声誉、口碑、服务等提升影响产品定价的能力，而不是仅靠争夺控制权大小；一体化决策的系统绩效水平高于分散决策，基于合作共赢的残值补贴机制可以很好地解决供应链双重边际效应问题，实现供应链各成员收益的帕累托改进。最后，通过算例验证了理论模型的有效性，并分析了控制力价格系数及消费者保鲜敏感系数对系统最优决策及绩效的影响。

关键词: 保鲜努力, 控制力, 生鲜品, 残值补贴

Abstract:

The fight for supply chain control powers has been a common problem between supply chain members， which makes supply chains unstable and leads to the loss of both parties' profits. The control power has a significant impact on product pricing， ordering quantity of the supply chain， and the cooperation performance of fresh product supply chain members. So， the allocation of supply chain control powers among different members is of great significance to the sustainability of the supply chain cooperation.Assuming that a two-level fresh product supply chain composed of one fresh product supplier and one large supermarket. The supermarket decides the selling price according to its own market positioning， consumer purchasing psychology and product market demand. At the same time， the supermarket will make certain freshness-keeping efforts to ensure the sales of fresh products. The supermarket has the supply chain control power which not only determines the selling price， but also controls the decision-making order. The selling price is regarded as a function of control power， and the demand is affected by the price， freshness-keeping efforts and random variable. A game model under the decentralized and centralized is constructed to maximize profits. The optimal control power， fresh-keeping effort and order quantity are solved respectively by Stackelberg game and cooperative game.This study introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into fresh product supply chain models. Some computational studies are conducted to investigate the impacts of price coefficient of control power and sensitivity coefficient of freshness-keeping efforts on the profits of supplier， supermarket， and the overall supply chain under decentralized and centralized system， and the effect of the residual value subsidy on coordinated supply chain member’s expected profit.Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly， the optimal control power exists objectively， and has a reverse relationship with the coefficient of control power. Supermarkets should improve the ability of influencing product pricing through their own reputation， public praise and service， instead of just competing for control power； Secondly， the profit， order quantity and the level of freshness-keeping efforts of centralized model is higher than that of decentralized model. But the profit of the supermarket will decrease. The residual value subsidy mechanism can solve the problem of double marginal effect of supply chain and realize Pareto improvement of supply chain members' income. Thirdly， holiday， weather， consumer psychology and other random factors will affect the market demand of fresh product. The managers of supermarkets can make appropriate measures with their supply chain control power to cope with changes in market demand.Our contribution lies in this paper introduces the endogenous variable of control power and builds the supply chain cooperation based on the control mode. The effects of control power and consumer freshness sensitivity coefficients on the optimal decision-making and system profit are analyzed. And it provides a certain reference for the supermarkets’ sales practice of fresh products.

Key words: freshness-keeping efforts, control power, fresh produce, residual value subsidy

中图分类号:

张艳,牟进进,王淑云. 商超具有价格控制力的生鲜品供应链优化决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(10): 266-275.

Yan ZHANG,Jin-jin MOU,Shu-yun WANG. Optimal Decision of Fresh Produce Supply Chain with Price Control Power in Supermarkets[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(10): 266-275.

图/表 6

表1

参数符号及含义"

符号	含义	符号	含义
$w$	批发价格	$g$	商超单位产品缺货成本，且 $g > 0$
$β$	消费者价格敏感系数	$S (q)$	期望销售量
$r$	消费者保鲜敏感系数	$I (q)$	每个销售期末商超处的期望库存量
$c$	合作社固定生产成本	$L (q)$	每个销售期末商超处的期望缺货量
$k$	商超保鲜努力成本系数	$π r d$ 、 $π r c$	分散决策、一体化决策下的商超利润
$ρ$	合作社和商超的控制力成本系数	$π s d$ 、 $π s c$	分散决策、一体化决策下的合作社利润
$q$	商超的订货量	$π T d$ 、 $π T c$	分散决策、一体化决策下的供应链系统利润

表1

表2

各参数赋值"

参数符号	$A$	$w$	$b$	$β$	$r$	$g$	$v$	$k$	$ρ$	$λ$	$c$
赋值	280	10	18	8	4	3	4	85	60	0.05	7

表2

表3

不同决策模式的绩效比较"

机制	$θ 2$	$p 2$	$e 2$	$q 2$	$π r *$	$π s *$	$π T *$
分散决策	0.747	23.440	0.632	122.735	1353.451	315.378	1668.829
一体化决策	0.667	22.007	0.706	132.233	1337.174	349.121	1686.295
基于共赢的残值补贴机制（ $V = 6$ ）	0.667	22.007	0.706	132.233	1359.300	326.995	1686.295
高残值补贴的分散决策（ $v = 6$ ）	0.729	23.128	0.618	111.314	1332.936	308.566	1641.502

表3

图1

图2

图3

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