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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (6): 174-184.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1072

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

电价改革与发电企业经理人行为：基于多目标委托代理模型

黄毅祥1, 余沙2, 蒲勇健2   

  1. 1.西北农林科技大学经济管理学院，陕西 杨凌712100；2.重庆大学经济与工商管理学院，重庆400044
  • 收稿日期:2020-06-05 修回日期:2020-09-15 出版日期:2023-06-20 发布日期:2023-06-17
  • 通讯作者: 黄毅祥(1989-)，男(汉族)，江西赣州人，西北农林科技大学经济管理学院，讲师，博士，研究方向：能源经济和博弈论，Emial：963639400@qq.com. E-mail:963639400@qq.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71673034)；陕西省自然科学基础研究计划项目(2020JQ-282)；陕西省社会科学基金资助项目(2020R042)；中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2021M692654)；中央高校基本科研业务费资助专项项目(2452020066；2452019190)

Electricity Price Reform and Manager Behavior of Generation Companies: Based on Multi-objective Principal-agent Model

HUANG Yi-xiang1, YU Sha2, PU Yong-jian2   

  1. 1. College of Economics and Management, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, China;2. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
  • Received:2020-06-05 Revised:2020-09-15 Online:2023-06-20 Published:2023-06-17
  • Contact: 黄毅祥 E-mail:963639400@qq.com

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摘要： 深化电力体制改革是新常态下降低社会用电成本、激活经济动能的重要途径。电力企业的国有属性，决定着其经理人决策行为的多重性和复杂性。本文通过构建多目标委托代理模型，研究售电侧改革对发电企业经理人决策的影响，揭示中国售电侧改革中电价下降的内在机理。研究发现：目前中国售电侧改革取得的电价下降成效，是行政作用的结果，而非市场竞争的有效引入。对于国有性质的电力企业，经理人的决策原则是“对于重要程度高、边际努力成本低的任务，付出更多的努力”，即电价改革的相对重要程度上升，经理人会选择放弃经济绩效而为降低电价努力。政府作为委托方追求的是社会福利最大化，最优激励系数存在“弱激励区”，会导致经理人一旦达到电价下降的行政要求，便不再付出更多努力。此外，企业的技术特征、经营风险和经理人的风险偏好也对经理人行为具有重要影响。电力体制改革在激发市场作用方面，亟需建立健全经理人激励制度。

关键词: 售电侧改革；发电集团；经理人行为；多目标委托代理

Abstract: On March 15, 2015, the Chinese government began a new round of reform of the power system, which focused on the orderly liberalization of competitive links outside the distribution, with the aim of reducing market electricity prices by “breaking the monopoly and introducing competition”. After the release of the power selling side, the proportion of China’s electricity market transactions has been increasing year by year. As of June 2019, market-oriented trading electricity accounted for 32.4% of the total electricity consumption of the whole society and 58.3% of the electricity consumption of the operating industry, releasing more than 210 billion yuan of reform dividends accumulatively. The reform of electricity marketization has greatly reduced the energy use costs of some enterprises and made a significant contribution to the strategic goal of China's steady macro-economic growth. However, behind the sharp fall in the market electricity prices, it was accompanied by widespread losses of power generation enterprises. In 2018, the total profit of power grid enterprises decreased by 24.3% compared with the previous year, while the losses of thermal power generation enterprises were as high as 43.8%. Why do power companies sacrifice their profits to reduce market electricity prices? Is it driven by the effective introduction of market competition, or is it due to other reasons? And how to prevent the financial risks caused by improper positioning? These questions are related to the promotion of China's power market deepening reform strategy, which needs to be studied and answered urgently.

Key words: market competition reform; power generation group; manager behavior; multi-objective principal-agent

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