考虑法律约束的两周期电子产品回收再制造决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0005

中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 255-262.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0005

考虑法律约束的两周期电子产品回收再制造决策研究

徐杰¹, 罗春林¹, 田歆^2,3

1.江西财经大学信息管理学院，江西南昌330013；2.中国科学院虚拟经济与数据科学研究中心，北京100190；3.中国科学院大学经济与管理学院，北京100190

收稿日期:2021-01-02 修回日期:2021-05-08 出版日期:2022-09-20 发布日期:2022-09-01
通讯作者: 罗春林(1978-)，男(汉族)，江西都昌人，江西财经大学信息管理学院，教授，博士，博士生导师，研究方向：运营管理、物流与供应链管理，Email:chunlinluo@126.com. E-mail:chunlinluo@126.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72161015，71862014，72172145，71964014)；江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ200520)；北京市自然科学基金资助项目(9212020)；江西省自然科学基金资助项目(20202BABL201012)

Recycling and Remanufacturing of E-products with Two Periods under Government’s Take-Back Regulation

XU Jie¹, LUO Chun-lin¹, TIAN Xin^2,3

1. School of Information Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China;2. Research Center on Fictitious Economy and Data Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;3. School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China

Received:2021-01-02 Revised:2021-05-08 Online:2022-09-20 Published:2022-09-01
Contact: 罗春林 E-mail:chunlinluo@126.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究电子产品制造商面临政府回收法律约束时的再制造决策问题。第一个周期开始时，制造商生产并决定新产品的价格。当产品的生命周期到达时，面对政府制定的回收法律约束，制造商回收市场中的旧产品用于再制造。第二个周期开始时，制造商同时决策新产品和再造品的价格。研究发现：根据逆向运营成本(即回收成本与再制造成本之和)与新产品生产成本的不同组合，制造商对应五个不同的回收再制造策略；当逆向运营成本低于一定阈值时，法律强制回收不会影响企业的利润；而高于该阈值时，法律强制回收会减少企业的利润，因为较高的逆向运营成本使得企业没有意愿回收旧产品。此外，研究收集了实际数据并进行了案例分析，结果表明研究模型具有较强的稳健性。

关键词: 电子产品；法律约束；两周期；再制造

Abstract: The amount of waste electronic product has been growing in recent years. Topic on environmental issue has received huge attention, and the take-back regulation has been enacted in different regions and countries around the world. In this paper, the operations decision of an electronic manufacturer in the presence of recycling and remanufacturing products under the government’s take-back regulation is considered. At the beginning of the first period, the manufacturer decides the price of the new product. At the end of the first period, used products are collected and remanufactured by the manufacturer under the government’s take-back regulation. Then in the second period, the manufacturer decides the prices of the new product and the remanufactured product. An economic model is formulated aiming to maximize the manufacturer’s profit which is subject to the quantity constraint, i.e., the remanufactured product quantity is less than the maximum collection that can be attained by the manufacturer. In addition, the maximal collection rate is considered to be endogenous. The manufacturer’s optimal decisions can be obtained by backward induction. Our results show that (1) there are five operational remanufacturing strategies for the manufacturer, contingent on the combination of reverse operational cost (sum of collecting cost and remanufacturing cost) and new product manufacturing cost. (2) When the reverse operationalcost is lower than a certain threshold, the take-back regulation will not hurt the manufacturer. Otherwise, the regulation will decrease the manufacturer’s profit, because the high reverse operational cost discourages the manufacturer’s incentive of recycling. Finally, we take iPhone 8 as an example to conductan empirical study. Data in our model is obtained in the following way. The used product collection cost can be found from Apple’s official website, and other dataabout parameters can be obtainedfrom existing literatures.Numerical study shows that our model is robust. In summary, these findings can contributeto the stream of product remanufacturing and help the decision makers to recycle and remanufacture electronic products.

Key words: electronic products; regulation; two periods; remanufacturing

中图分类号:

F273.7

徐杰, 罗春林, 田歆. 考虑法律约束的两周期电子产品回收再制造决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(9): 255-262.

XU Jie, LUO Chun-lin, TIAN Xin. Recycling and Remanufacturing of E-products with Two Periods under Government’s Take-Back Regulation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(9): 255-262.

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考虑法律约束的两周期电子产品回收再制造决策研究

Recycling and Remanufacturing of E-products with Two Periods under Government’s Take-Back Regulation

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