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中国管理科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (10): 179-186.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.10.019

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于动态微分博弈理论的工程应急决策研究

王长峰, 庄文英   

  1. 北京邮电大学经济管理学院, 北京 100876
  • 收稿日期:2014-12-30 修回日期:2016-07-27 出版日期:2017-10-20 发布日期:2017-12-15
  • 通讯作者: 王长峰(1965-),男(汉族),河北人,北京邮电大学经济管理学院教授、博士生导师,国际项目管理研究所所长,研究方向:重大项目风险监控与决策,E-mail:wangcf@bupt.edu.cn. E-mail:wangcf@bupt.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271031);教育部人文社科规划基金项目(09YJA630011)

Study on Emergency Decision Making of Major Projects Based on the Dynamic Differential Game Theory

WANG Chang-feng, ZHUANG Wen-ying   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
  • Received:2014-12-30 Revised:2016-07-27 Online:2017-10-20 Published:2017-12-15

摘要: 鉴于突发事件发展与演化的不确定性与动态性,立足于更为优化的应急决策,从多主体竞争角度出发,基于复杂动态环境下工程应急管理中两决策主体的特性:一方面追求最优风险控制,同时力争自身利益最大化,本文建立了连续型动态微分博弈模型。算法方面将动态博弈理论与最优控制理论相结合,并通过MATLAB软件进行模型的数值求解和仿真,阐释应急管理系统中各组织实体之间竞争与合作并存的博弈关系和演化过程。进一步针对部分参数进行了灵敏度分析,挖掘系统关键影响因子,提出可行性建议。本文研究从理论和模型角度探讨了突发事件应急管理的动态决策机制,为实践中应急策略的择优和应急措施的实施提供了必要的方法支撑,为实现高效应急决策,优化资源集成奠定了理论基础。

关键词: 应急管理, 动态微分博弈模型, 纳什均衡, 灵敏度分析

Abstract: In view of the uncertainty and dynamic characteristics of the development and evolution of the emergency event in engineering projects, as to make optimal emergency-decision, from the perspective of multi subject competition, based on the characteristics of different game competitors(the regulators and the decision maker) under the complex and dynamic environment in projectengineering emergency management, a continuous dynamic differential game model of two participates is established to describe the process.While making a decision, both competitors want to make an optimal-control on the system risk, as to seeking the maximum interests of their own at the same time. In the algorithm apart, the dynamic game theory and optimal control theory are combined, and the MATLAB software is used to solve the model.Furthermore,in order to study the influence of the various parameters in the management system, the sensitivity analysis of the model is carried out.By sensitivity analysis, the corresponding management recommendations targeted can be put forward, and it can do great help to explore and explain the evolution process of the competition and cooperation among the various entities in the complex network of risk management.In this paper, the dynamic decision-making mechanism of emergency is discussed from the theoretical level, which can be used as a reference to some related research and help to make a more profound understanding of the formation of emergency management system, while it can also provide the necessary support for the selection and implementation of emergency strategy in practice.In this way, the study can help managers to make efficient decisions and optimize the integration of resources.

Key words: emergency management, dynamic differential game, nash equilibrium, sensitivity analysis

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