基于消费者需求差异和渠道权力结构差异的MT-CLSC定价、效率与协调研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (6): 34-42.

基于消费者需求差异和渠道权力结构差异的MT-CLSC定价、效率与协调研究

王玉燕¹, 申亮²

1. 山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 山东济南 250014;
2. 山东财经大学财政税务学院, 山东济南 250014

收稿日期:2012-11-12 修回日期:2013-04-16 出版日期:2014-06-20 发布日期:2014-06-26
作者简介:王玉燕（1978- ），女（汉族），山东禹城人，山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院，副教授，硕士生导师，管理学博士，研究方向：博弈论与供应链管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71173133）；国家社会科学基金资助项目（12CGL024）；山东省社会科学规划研究项目（11CJJJ15）；济南青年科技明星计划资助项目（20120118）

Pricing, Efficiency, and Coordination in MT-CLSC Considering Differences in Customer Demand and Differences Channel Power Structures

WANG Yu-yan¹, SHEN Liang²

1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China;
2. School of Finance, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, China

Received:2012-11-12 Revised:2013-04-16 Online:2014-06-20 Published:2014-06-26

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 相比其他回收模式，制造商负责回收废旧品的闭环供应链（简称MT-CLSC）在节约成本、提高系统利润方面更加有效。针对MT-CLSC渠道权力结构的差异，结合消费者对新产品和再造品的偏好及其影响，文章构建了四种不同的MT-CLSC模型，分别是制造商和零售商合作决策的集中式模型、制造商权力大于零售商权力的分散式决策模型、制造商权力小于零售商权力的分散式决策模型、制造商和零售商权力均等的分散式决策模型，根据各个模型的不同特点，计算出各模型的最优定价策略、回收策略以及相应的利润、渠道效率。然后，借助数值分析的方法，对不同模型的定价策略、回收策略、利润、渠道效率进行比较。研究发现：（1）各模式中，渠道利润以及MT-CLSC各成员的利润均随着消费者偏好系数的增大而减少；（2）在分散决策下，制造商和零售商的利润均与双方的权力相关，权力越大，相应的利润越多；（3）分散决策模式中，制造商和零售商权力均等的模式渠道效率最高，效率最低的是零售商占主导地位的权力结构；（4）制造商和零售商合作的集中式决策模式是最优的决策模式，此时新产品、再造品的定价最低，废旧品的“回收——需求率”最低，而渠道利润却最高，但是这种模式通过协调机制才能实现。为此，文章最后设计了有效的协调机制，使得集中式模式得以实现。本文的研究结论对丰富完善闭环供应链理论和推广应用闭环供应链具有一定的指导作用。

关键词: 消费者需求差异, 渠道权力, 闭环供应链

Abstract: Compared with other recycling model of closed-loop supply chain, closed-loop supply chain of manufacturer taking-back (MT-CLSC) is more effective in saving the cost and increasing the system profit. According to the power structure differences of MT-CLSC channel, and considering customers' different preferences and its influence to new products and remanufactured products, four types of MT-CLSC models are constructed in this paper, which are the centralized cooperative decision-making model of manufacturers and retailers, the decentralized decision-making model of either manufacturers power greater than retailers, or less than retailers, and the decentralized decision-making model of manufacturers power equaling to retailers. According to the characteristics of each model, optimal pricing strategies, recovery strategies and corresponding profits and channel efficiency are calculated and compared then by numerical analysis method. The following conclusions are given: (1) in each model, channel profit and MT-CLSC members profits decreases with the increase of the customer preference coefficient; (2) under decentralized decisions, the profits of manufacturers and retailers were associated with their power. Greater the power is, more is the profit; (3) under decentralized decisions, when the power of manufacturers is equal to retailers, the channel efficiency is the highest, and when the power of retailers is greater than manufacturers, the channel efficiency is the lowest; (4) the centralized cooperative decision-making model of manufacturers and retailers is the optimal model. In this model, the prices of the new products and remanufactured products are the lowest, and the recycling-demand rate of the waste is the lowest, while the channel profit is the highest. However, this model can only be achieved through coordination mechanism. Therefore, an effective coordination mechanism which can achieve the centralized mode is further designed. The conclusions would be helpful to enrich the closed-loop supply chain theory and popularize the application of closed-loop supply chain in reality.

Key words: differences in customer demand preference, channel power, closed-loop supply chain

中图分类号:

F406.7
F224

王玉燕, 申亮. 基于消费者需求差异和渠道权力结构差异的MT-CLSC定价、效率与协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(6): 34-42.

WANG Yu-yan, SHEN Liang. Pricing, Efficiency, and Coordination in MT-CLSC Considering Differences in Customer Demand and Differences Channel Power Structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(6): 34-42.

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